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Deep Ecology and Heideggerian Phenomenology
Matthew Antolick
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the connections between Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology and
Martin Heidegger’s Phenomenology. The latter provides a philosophical basis for the
former. Martin Heidegger’s critique of traditional metaphysics and his call for an ‘event’
ontology that is deeper than the traditional substance ontology opens a philosophical
space in which a different conception of what it is to be emerges. Heidegger’s view of
humans also provides a basis for the wider and deeper conception of self Arne Naess
seeks: one that gets rid of the presupposition that human beings are isolated subjects
embedded in a framework of objects distinct from them.
Both Heidegger and Naess illustrate how the substance-ontological dogma affects
human culture, encouraging humans to live as if they were divorced from their
environmental surroundings. When humans live according to an atomistic conception of
themselves as independent from their context, alienation results, not only from each
other, and not only of humans from the surrounding environment, but from themselves as
well.
This thesis focuses on Heidegger’s employment of the conception of poiesis or
self-bringing-forth as clarifying the “root” of such ecosystemic processes as growth,
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maturation, reproduction, and death. Thus, Heidegger’s call to phenomenology – “to the
things themselves” – is a call away from the objectifying dichotomies through which
substance ontology articulates the world into isolated components.
It is the purpose of this thesis to demonstrate not only the connections between the
later Heidegger and Naess, but also to argue in favor of their claims that traditional
philosophical perspectives regarding humans, the environment, and ethics need to be reappropriated in a new way in order to avoid further ecological degradation and provide
for the health and well being of the future generations that will inevitably inherit the
effects of our present actions.
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Chapter One: Heidegger’s Phenomenology
A. Technology
What is the Essence of Technology?
Heidegger’s analysis of technology is not a simple examination of technological
method. It is a phenomenology of the technological mode of being. His phenomenology
always strives for deeper probing. Deeper probing focuses on a question in a questioning
manner. In the Introduction to Metaphysics, the question is: “why are there beings at all
instead of nothing?”1 In The Question Concerning Technology, it is: what is the essence
of technology? Although the question is not explicitly formulated as such, it constitutes
the focus of the essay.
In the first paragraph of QCT, Heidegger speaks of questioning in general.
“Questioning builds a way. We would be advised, therefore, above all to pay heed to the
way, and not to fix our attention on isolated sentences and topics. The way is a way of
thinking.”2 The goal of such questioning is what he calls a “free relationship”: one that
allows the human essence to open itself to the essence of technology.
It is important to note that the question (of both IM and QCT) can be read in at
least two ways. The direction of the question – what it is asking - will be taken in
accordance with the comportment of the questioner. A logical positivist, for instance,
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will focus on the clear-cut facts of the question, while tending to dismiss questions of
value as a completely different type of enterprise.
We must start where we are, and be content, in the meantime, with clear-cut
answers - but not too content. We can note for starters that the question “what is the
essence of technology” can also be read in a way that “transcends” (a better way of
putting it is perhaps “probes beneath”) a typical positivist reading. Whether or not the
question is a deeper probing is not a matter of changing words or syntax within the
question’s explicit formulation. It is a matter of comportment: a mode of seeing or an
angle from which one reads or sees.
What is it to “probe beneath positivism?” First we should ask: is this what
Heidegger intends? It appears to provide an answer as to why Heidegger, when speaking
of questioning, simultaneously urges the reader not to get hung up on isolated details. He
seems to be making an implicit claim: genuine questioning is blocked by such a focus.
Secondly, is positivism equivalent to the technological mode of being? The
answer to this question could constitute an essay in itself, and we’ve not the room for it
here. But we can for now note a strong similarity between positivism and technological
thinking: The positivist comportment could be characterized as an urge fix and resolve
the issue, making it precise and testable. Clear-cut precision means to be free from
confusion and ambiguity. Technology, too, certainly involves an increase of calculation
over indefiniteness, and a dislike of ambiguity.
One might ask at this point: is “freedom” freedom from the ambiguous? From
mystery? Both positivism and technological thinking share a common tendency toward
clear-cut answers and pre-ordered knowledge frameworks. And Heidegger, in QCT,
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states that “Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we
passionately affirm or deny it.”3 Putting what has been said so far together, it seems we
cannot close the issue so quickly. We must remain with the question for the time being:
“Is freedom from ambiguity really freedom?”
We as modern Americans tend to answer this question in the affirmative.
Heidegger saw the technological quantification of everything as a “will to mastery”
which “becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human
control.”4 Control, mastery, clear-cut-rigidity, pre-formed knowledge frameworks: all are
strands in the web called “technological mastery.” Technology appears to be about
human power, but over what?
A basic answer is: power over being thwarted. Perhaps this is too basic. A more
detailed answer is: power over anything that disrupts human means-end activity. As
means-end activity, technology is “instrumental.” Heidegger says “the instrumental
definition of technology is so correct that it even holds for modern technology,” in
addition to the “old, handiwork technology.” This answer is obviously deeper than
“calculators and computers.” But it is not the deepest.
Again and again throughout his philosophical career, Heidegger returns to the
theme of multiple possibilities – possible readings, possible paradigms. This is true not
only for QCT alone, but for the entire range of his writings, from Being and Time to The
Anaximander Fragment to The Principle of Reason to Gelassenheit and beyond. It takes
various forms.

3
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We see this play of possibilities at an early point in QCT. Heidegger claims the
instrumental definition of technology is “correct,” but not necessarily true: that there is a
difference.
But suppose now that technology were no mere means, how would it stand with
the will to master it? Yet we said, did we not, that the instrumental definition of
technology is correct? To be sure. The correct always fixes upon something
pertinent in whatever is under consideration. However, in order to be correct, this
fixing by no means needs to uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at
the point where such an uncovering happens does the true come to pass. For that
reason the merely correct is not yet the true.5
Although there is indeed a difference between correctness and truth, this
difference is not dichotomous: there is not an absolute distinction. Correctness is
connected with truth, albeit derivatively. The realization of the derivative nature of the
“correct” brings with it a realization that there is more than one possible way of reading
and understanding “correctness.”
It is easy to fall into the same mistaken gaze on the “what” rather than upon “that”
which brings the “what” to presence. Obviously, this “that which brings to presence”
cannot be any particular what. We started with a fairly straightforward question - “what
is the essence of technology?” – and have seemingly stumbled into a discussion of
multiple-possible readings. We rightfully ask, with Heidegger, “But where have we
strayed to?”6 Are we off track? What is it to be on track? If to be “on track” is to be
“correct,” then not only do we already have an answer to this question, but we can also
get a hint as to the correctness-seeking comportment from which such a question springs.
In turn, our position right here and now in this examination of Heidegger’s take
on technology sheds light not only on his claim, cited above, that “questioning builds a
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way” and that we should “pay heed” to it, but also on Heidegger’s statement, slightly
later in QCT, that “So long as we do not allow ourselves to go into these questions,
causality, and with it instrumentality, and with the latter the accepted definition of
technology, remain obscure and groundless.”7
What remains “obscure” if we do not allow ourselves these questions? The
answer to this question is the answer to “what is the essence of technology?” We can
thus make a preliminary statement to help us on the way: correctness is something
different from (but not utterly separate from) truth.
It seems we could circle about forever. But if with our questioning we are indeed
building a way, as Heidegger says, then we must somehow manage to keep pushing
forward. But Heidegger also says that what we are actually after is a return. This type of
questioning requires something of that resoluteness of which Heidegger speaks so
pervasively in Being and Time. So many questions; nonetheless we must ask another:
towards “what” is this “way” leading which is being constructed by us in our questioning
comportment?

Technology as a Mode of Revealing
“What technology is,” says Heidegger, “when represented as a means, discloses
itself when we trace instrumentality back to fourfold causality.”8 Of fourfold causality, he
states “they differ from one another, yet they belong together.”9
We are questioning concerning technology, and we have arrived now at aletheia,
at revealing. What has the essence of technology to do with revealing? The
answer: everything. For every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing. Bringing7
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forth, indeed, gathers within itself the four modes of occasioning – causality – and
rules them throughout. Within its domain belong ends and means, belong
instrumentality. Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic
of technology. If we inquire step by step, into what technology, represented as
means, actually is, then we shall arrive at revealing. The possibility of all
productive manufacturing lies in revealing…Technology is therefore no mere
means. Technology is a way of revealing.10
Technology, as instrumental (and causal) is a bringing-forth. That is, technology
is a way of bringing things to presence in an instrumental (means-ends) manner. But
such bringing-forth is not merely instrumental. All bringing-forth, says Heidegger, is
“poiesis,”11 through which “the growing things of nature as well as whatever is
completed through the crafts and the arts come at any given time to their appearance.”12
Within the questioning span between causality and revealing [aletheia],
Heidegger progresses through a trail of concepts: 1) Legein – “to consider carefully,”
which, he claims13, has its roots in aphophainesthai – “to bring forward into
appearance”14; 2) Hypokeisthai – “lying before and lying ready” – as that for which the
four causes, as four ways of being responsible, are responsible, insofar as such
characterizes “the presencing of something that presences”15; 3) Ver-an-lassen – “an
occasioning or inducing to go forward” of something “into its complete arrival”16; which
leads to 4) Physis – “the arising of something from out of itself” which is also a “bringing
10

Ibid. 12; my emphasis
This altered spelling will be maintained throughout this thesis. It is spelled this way (with the added ‘i’),
in order to distinguish it, as a concept, from the merely poetic. Whereas poetry is a way of bringing forth, it
is something done by humans, and is thus a mode of techne, or aided bringing forth, as Julian Young puts it
in his excellent work Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 2002. See especially
pages 37-44, where Young charts two “kinds” of poiesis, namely phusis and techne. Taking this model as a
conceptual ground, poetry as it is regularly understood appears as derivative of poiesis. When speaking of
poiesis in this paper, poetry will be used (differentiated by italics), whereas ‘poetry’ will accord with the
usual definition of the word.
12
Ibid. 10-11
13
Heidegger’s etymological adventures, not to mention his historical-conceptual tracings, are far from
controversial. See especially Paul Friedlander’s Plato, Vol. I, (New York, Pantheon Books, 1958).
14
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forth, poesis.”17 The revealing, then, of which technology is a mode, is a bringing-forth
which “comes to pass only insofar as something unconcealed comes into
unconcealment.”18
Heidegger then produces a genealogy of the word “technology,” tracing it to the
Greek technikon, and techne, which he says is “the name…for the activities and skills of
the craftsman,” as well as “for the arts of the mind and the fine arts.” As such, says
Heidegger, techne “belongs to bringing-forth, to poiesis.” Thus, “techne is a mode of
aletheuein.”19
It is here that Heidegger, in his apparent straying from the (main) question of
technology, is found to have been “on track” all along, when he writes of techne:
It reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here before us,
whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another. Whoever builds a
house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought forth,
according to the perspectives of the four modes of occasioning. This revealing
gathers together in advance the aspect and the matter of ship or house, with a view
to the finished thing envisioned as completed, and from this gathering determines
the manner of its construction. Thus what is decisive in techne does not lie at all
in making and manipulating, nor in the using of means, but rather in the
aforementioned revealing. It is as revealing, and not as manufacturing, that
techne is a bringing forth.20
According to Heidegger, it is only by focusing on technology as a mode of
revealing that the essence of modern technology will show itself to us. It will not do
merely to ground the human employment of modern apparatus in scientific method.
Modern science, in turn, would not be what it is if not for the use of such apparatus, but
we could just as easily reverse the direction of this attempted grounding. The
relationship between science and technology is rather a mutual one: this is what gives
17

Ibid. 10
Ibid. 11
19
Ibid. 13
20
Ibid. 13; my emphasis
18
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modern technology its distinction. With fourfold causality, we do much better to ask:
what unites them from the beginning? The question streamlines our inquiry.
The poet and the technician or maker both reveal. But they are different – though
not absolutely. Whereas the poet reveals in a manner that allows “the arising of
something from out of itself,” the latter, according to Heidegger, reveals in a manner that
challenges – that is, “The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging
[Herausforden], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that
can be extracted and stored as such.”21 Such challenging, he calls an “expediting”
[Fordern] – a “driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense.”22
Here we arrive at Heidegger’s distinction between the windmill whose sails “turn
in the wind” but “are left entirely to the wind’s blowing,”23 and the hydroelectric plant on
the Rhine through which “the Rhine itself appears as something at our command” – “a
water power supplier” whose essence derives not from the river, but “out of the essence
of the power station.”24 He makes a similar distinction between the peasant farmer who
“places the seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase”25
and a tract of land which is mined for ore through which “the earth now reveals itself as a
coal mining district.”26
The windmill and the peasant farmer allow that which presences to come forth
from itself just as it is in itself. The typical human-centered focus on the matter offers a
picture of the wind as a mere means to human ends. Here, human intentionality is the

21
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cause and driving force of the action, whereas, in the more poetic sense of bringing forth,
the wind remains wind, and the peasant farmer plants and harvests according to the
seasons, “in keeping with the forces of nature.” In contrast, the mining operation and the
power plant cause earth and river to be revealed as something other than that which each
is, respectively, in itself – that is, as solely a thing of use for human beings. Heidegger
calls these latter modes of revealing “standing reserve”:
What kind of unconcealment is it, then, that is peculiar to that which comes to
stand forth through this setting-upon that challenges? Everywhere everything is
ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so it may
be on call for further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own
standing. We call it the standing-reserve [Bestand]. The name standing reserve
assumes the rank of an inclusive rubric. It designates nothing less than the way in
which everything presences that is wrought upon by the challenging revealing.
Whatever stands by in the sense of standing reserve no longer stands over against
us as object.27
What does it mean for something to no longer stand “over-against us as an
object”? Something that stands “over against” us has its own standing. But, as standing
reserve, it “has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable.”28 Characteristic of
the technological mode is a blurring of the distinction between “ordered” and “existent.”
A mode of thinking comes to pass in which things as revealed through human ordering
are taken to be things as they are in themselves. The process of ordering is forgotten: we
forget that we see things in an ordered fashion because they have been ordered by human
beings according to instrumental value schemes. But if ordering as standing reserve is a
mode of technology, and technology is a mode of revealing, is not standing reserve, too,
a mode of revealing?

27
28

Ibid. 17
Ibid.
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Standing can be seen as an effect29 of challenging forth. As such, it too involves
an “unreasonable demand.” But what is the reason that this demand opposes in order to
be called “unreasonable?” We know it is not reason in the typical sense of rational
ordering. The predominance of such ordering, in fact, is what characterizes standing
reserve as “unreasonable” in the first place.

Enframing [Ge-stell]
The “reason” at work here is, perhaps, “reason” in the sense of harmony and
balance: the growth cycles of plants, the waxing and waning of the moon, the progression
and recession of tides, the beating of the heart. Natural things in themselves, when we
pay attention to them, are found to have an order of their own: not one simply imposed
upon them by human imagination. A farmer can scream at his corn to grow faster, but he
must ultimately yield to seasonal growth patterns. These points surely deserve more
explanation, but we leave them for the time being.
Heidegger is questioning technology precisely because the modern technological
mode of being does not comply with such natural “reasonable” rhythms and cycles.
Instead, technology “challenges” nature out of phase with natural cycles. But Heidegger
is clear about the fact that such setting-upon does not derive strictly from technology.
Technology is a mode of revealing, of poiesis. As such, this setting upon is not a strictly
human doing, for to say such would be to assume a causal framework in which humans
are the source of that revealing – the very thought pattern that Heidegger sees as
problematic of the technological mode of thinking.
29

We say “effect,” because the technological/instrumental of thinking employs means-ends frameworks
within which the words “cause” and “effect” have their meaning. Causality takes place within a
concealment of the poetic.
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Just as (and perhaps because) setting upon cannot be derived from technology, so
too, neither can it be derived solely from human activity. Although technology “is a
means to an end” and “a human activity” and these two belong together, revealing reveals
itself as something more primordial. Technology and means-end human activity are
modes of revealing, not the other way around (in the terms of which is more primordial).
Man does not reveal out of his own self-activity. Revealing occurs through, but
not out of, man, viz. as an effect of which man is the cause. Nevertheless, something
takes place in the technological shift from poetic self-revealing to challenging (and the
resulting standing reserve). This “something” is Ge-stell [Enframing]: “that challenging
claim which gathers man thither to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve.”30
Enframing means the gathering together of that setting-upon which sets upon
man, i.e. challenges him forth, to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as
standing reserve. Enframing means that way of revealing which holds sway in the
essence of modern technology and is itself nothing technological. On the other
hand, all those things that are so familiar to us and are standard parts of an
assembly, such as rods, pistons, and chassis, belong to the technological. The
assembly itself, however, together with the aforementioned stockparts, falls
within the sphere of technological activity; and this activity always merely
responds to the challenge of Enframing itself or brings it about.31
Heidegger is careful to distinguish between mere technological things and the
technological activity out of which such “things” come to be. We are not to assume
rational order as a primordially accurate reading of “the way things are.” To do so is to
forget Heidegger’s analysis of the original meanings of phusis, aletheia, and poiesis,
meanings that presuppose a mysterious openness that calculative thinking in the
instrumental thought mode automatically rules out (or attempts as much as possible to
diminish). And yet, this ordering is a result of a setting-upon that challenges humans to

30
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Ibid. 19
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reveal things as part of an pre-ordered structure. We note briefly that this is the original
meaning of Ge-stell: a bookrack, a skeleton, scaffolding. But Heidegger sees multiplepossible ways of reading this concept. The meanings of Ge-stell just listed are all noun
forms. Heidegger is questioning beneath isolated sentences and topics, which means he
is questioning beneath the isolated elements of which dictionary definitions are made. He
is seeking to get at the activity invoked through this word – and not only the word, of
course, but the phenomena to which it points. Challenging is, of course, something done
– but by what (or whom)?
The word stellen [to set upon] in the name Ge-stell [Enframing] not only means
challenging. At the same time, it should preserve the suggestion of another
Stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and presenting [Her- und
Dar-stellen] which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come forth into
unconcealment. This producing that brings forth – e.g., the erecting of a statue in
the temple precinct, and the challenging-ordering now under consideration are
indeed fundamentally different, and yet they remain related in their essence. Both
are ways of revealing, of aletheia. In Enframing, that unconcealment comes to
pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals the real as
standing-reserve. This work is therefore neither only a human activity nor a
means within such activity…It remains true, nonetheless, that man in the
technological age is, in a particularly striking way, challenged forth into
revealing.32
Enframing “should preserve the suggestion of another Stellen” – poiesis (as
letting be) – but it does not. It rather “banishes man into that kind of revealing which is
an ordering.” Such ordering “drives out every other possibility of revealing,” and, says
Heidegger, “Above all, Enframing conceals that revealing which, in the sense of poiesis,
lets what presences come forth into appearance.”33 Self-revealing gets concealed and renamed as a human-activity within a calculable order. Such order is the realm within

32
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which, mentioned above, “Whatever stands by in the sense of standing reserve no longer
stands over against us as object.”
As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but does
so, rather, exclusively as standing reserve, and man, in the midst of
objectlessness, is nothing but the orderer of the standing reserve, then he comes to
the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself
will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so
threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth. In this way the
impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as
it is his construct. This illusion gives rise to one final delusion: it seems as though
man everywhere and always encounters only himself…In truth, however,
presicely nowhere does man today any longer encounter himself, i.e. his essence.
[QCT 27]
This is a rich passage. Particularly interesting is where Heidegger locates
anthropocentrism: precisely at the “point” where poetic bringing-forth into the selfstanding of the object as object no longer concerns humans. He thus implicitly locates a
direct connection between the concealment of poetic bringing forth and the selfexaltation of human beings to “lord of the earth” status. This latter, it seems safe to say,
is also a form of concealment. There is thus a direct correspondence between the
concealment of poetic bringing-forth and anthropocentrism.
But, again, technology does not cause this anthropocentrism. Technology is a
mode of revealing. The key to understanding this tendency of humans to exalt
themselves as “lords of the earth” has to do, rather, with the comportment through which
they employ technological methods, a comportment that conceals the original mode of
revealing that gives rise, through poetic self-arising, to humans, their ideas, and their
employment. That “all of this” is a human doing, says Heidegger, is an “impression that
comes to prevail,” [my emphasis], not an apprehension of things as they are in
themselves. Such apprehensions can come about, if at all, only through an understanding
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of the essence of technology as poiesis. It is for this reason that Heidegger makes a
distinction between technology and its essence.
It is important also to note that this concealment is not just a concealment by
humans of the nature of self-revealing poiesis. Insofar as poiesis is the essence of all
bringing-forth, it is also the essence of concealment. Heidegger says “the challenging
Enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing, bringing-forth, but it conceals
revealing itself and with it that wherein unconcealment, i.e. truth, comes to pass.”34 This
is, then, a double-concealment, for the same reason that technology is not something done
solely out of human activity, but, rather, something that occurs through humans. The
occurrence of a double-concealment is possible on the basis of poiesis as the essence of
concealment.
Heidegger also brings notice to the connection between Enframing as an orderingrevealing and modern scientific theorization which “pursues and entraps nature as a
calculable coherence of forces.”35 But the ambiguity remains: who or what challenges,
entraps, and pursues? Perhaps the only proper answer is that it is essentially not a “who”
or a “what” that does so. The closest answer we gain from the above-cited passage is,
again, poiesis. We want an answer to our “who?” and “what,” and (no wonder) it seems
Heidegger does not give us one, except perhaps to ask “Does this revealing happen
somewhere beyond all human doing?” and answer “No. But neither does it happen
exclusively in man, or decisively through man.”36

34
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Ibid. 21
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B. The Thing and Uniform Distancelessness
In order to attain a better grasp of what Heidegger attempts to reveal in QCT, it
helps to concentrate on something that has come up more than once in our investigation:
the phenomenon of objectlessness, or the no-longer-standing-over-against-us
characteristic of the “object” within the technological sphere of Enframing. This theme is
developed most fully in The Thing.37
Heidegger begins the essay with a discussion of the effects of technological
development on distance:
All distances in space and time are shrinking. Man now reaches overnight, by
plane, places which formerly took weeks and months to travel…The germination
and growth of plants, which remained hidden throughout the seasons, is now
exhibited publicly in a minute, on film…Man puts the longest distances behind
him in the shortest time. He puts the greatest distances behind himself and thus
puts everything before himself at the shortest range…Yet the frantic abolition of
all distances brings no nearness…Short distance is not in itself nearness. Nor is
great distance remoteness.38
Insofar as “distance” is regarded in terms of a space between two objective
designations (points), distance and objectness are codependent (and this definition is thus
“correct”). The technological abolition of distance is thus, for Heidegger, an abolition of
objectness. The thing that no longer stands over against us as an object has no selfstanding, and thus no distance from us in any measure, be it near or far. “Everything gets
lumped together into uniform distancelessness” in which “everything is equally near and
equally far”39 – mere positions on a space-time grid.
What is it to be “near”? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to
question into the nature of a “thing.” “But what is a thing? Man has so far given no
37

Martin Heidegger, “The Thing,” Poetry, Language, Thought. (New York, Harper Colophon Books,
1971)
38
Ibid. 165
39
Ibid. 166
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more thought to this question than he has to nearness.”40 Through the abolition of
distance, the nature of “thing” has been concealed and forgotten. We may already notice
a connection here between the “nature” of the thing and poiesis, in QCT. The two
conceptions, in a way, are pointing to the same phenomenon, though not a phenomenon
in the sense of something that can be directly signified. Uniform distancelessness thus
corresponds to the thing in the sense of standing-reserve: as cut off from its essence – as a
lack of preservation.
Being “cut-off” can also be read in more than one way. Dreyfus, in his Being In
the World, describes distance as a function of Da-sein’s spatiality, which “depends on
Dasein’s concernful being-in-the-world.” An object is “near” when it is brought into Dasein’s “referential nexus,” and thus “de-distanced.” Distance, rather than being a purely
mathematical concept, is on this reading related to Da-sein’s activity within a world.
“The degree of availability is the nearness of concern.” 41
Heidegger uses a jug for an apt example of a “thing.” Its essence consists in more
than its objectness. To say so, however, seems to contradict a point subtly established in
our analysis so far. We said that when something no-longer stands over-against us as an
object, its thingly essence gets concealed. It is important to realize the difference,
however, between object-representation and objectness. Something actually standing
“over-against” us stands in itself, apart from our representation of that thing as object. Its
objectness is not dependent on our representational activity as such:
As a vessel, the jug is something self-sustained, something that stands on its own.
This standing on its own characterizes the jug as something that is selfsupporting, or independent. As the self-supporting independence of something
40
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independent, the jug differs from an object. An independent, self-supporting
thing may become an object if we place it before us, whether in immediate
perception or by bringing it to mind in recollective representation. However, the
thingly character of the thing does not consist in its being a represented object,
nor can it be defined in any way in terms of the objectness, the over-againstness,
of the object.42
The point being made here is identical to the points regarding technology as a
mode of revealing in the sense of poiesis in QCT. That which is thingly in the thing does
not derive from the thing as thing, but from “something” deeper. In the same way, the
making of the thing is not the cause of the thingly nature of the thing, just as the essence
of technology is nothing technological.43 “The making, it is true, lets the jug come into
its own. But that which in the jug’s nature is its own is never brought about by its
making.”44 Letting-come-into-its-own is poiesis - of techne as a mode of aletheuein
(revealing) - like the peasant farmer who “places the seed in the keeping of the forces of
growth and watches over its increase.”45
Uniform distancelessness results from human attempts to master distance. It is
the same with the self-exalting of humans as “lord of the earth.” In technological/
calculative thinking, the poetic essence of the thing is held inferior to (and thus forgotten
and replaced by) representations. Here, “science represents something real, by means of
which it is objectively controlled,” and this only because
Science always encounters only what its kind of representation has admitted
beforehand as an object possible for science…It is said that scientific knowledge
is compelling. Certainly. But what does its compulsion consist in? In our
instance it consists in the compulsion to relinquish the wine-filled jug and to put
in its place a hollow within which a liquid spreads. Science makes the jug thing
into a non-entity in not permitting things to be the standard for what is real.46
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Obviously, we see the same ambiguity surfacing again with this analysis of the
thingliness of the thing. We typically refer only to inanimate objects like rocks and cars
as “things.” But Heidegger is trying to convey a wider meaning of “thing,” much in the
same way Meister Eckhart used it: the cautious and abstemious name for something that
is at all.47 Furthermore, “the meaning of the name ‘thing’ varies with the interpretation
of that which is – of entities.”48
With this last sentence we finally get an at least partial grasp of how interpretation
and multiple-possible readings play through Heidegger’s thinking. Insofar as
interpretation grounds the meaning of “thing,” its meaning will appear “ambiguous” to
the positivist or technological mindset seeking conceptual rigor and clarity. Ambiguity,
then, is problematic only from the standpoint that demands such clarity: a world preordained and fit for human understanding, manipulation, and use. The fact that we are
asking “But when and in what way do things exist as things?” is itself a symptom of the
uniform distancelessness characterizing the modern technological appropriation of world.
“This is a question we raise in the midst of the domination of the distanceless.”49

C. The Thing and Dwelling
We observed that nearness is not a function of calculable distance. And
Heidegger himself states, in Building, Dwelling, Thinking, that “nearness and distance
can become mere distance, mere intervals of intervening space.”50 Since calculable
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distance is codependent with objective representation, we may assert that nearness is also
not a function of something being close to or far away (in measurable space) from an
individual.
What is nearness? To discover the nature of nearness, we gave thought to the jug
near by. We have sought the nature of nearness and found the nature of the jug as
a thing. But in this discovery we also catch sight of the nature of nearness. The
thing things. In thinging, it stays earth and sky, divinities and mortals. Staying,
the thing brings the four, in their remoteness, near to one another. This bringingnear is nearing. Nearing is the presencing of nearness. Nearness brings near –
draws nigh to one another – the far and, indeed, as far. Nearness preserves
farness. Preserving, farness, nearness, presences nearness in nearing that farness.
Bringing near in this way, nearness conceals its own self and remains, in its own
way, nearest of all.51
It is indeed because “nearness preserves farness” that the modern technological conquest
of distance has resulted in uniform distancelessness.
The technological mode of thinking results from a series of abstractions. The first
abstraction results in “mere distance.” From this, “a further abstraction can be made, to
analytic-algebraic relations. What these relations make room for is the possibility of the
purely mathematical construction of manifolds with an arbitrary number of dimensions.”
The “space” rendered from these abstractions, in turn, “contains no spaces and no
places.”52 Mathematics is thus, it may be said, “twice removed from reality.” And yet it
comes to dominate what counts as “real thinking” in the present technological era.
We are pushing beneath abstractions, towards the primordial “that” which is no
particular thing, but from which, nevertheless, all things are. The above cited paragraph
gives us a nexus from which a more thorough understanding of the technological can be
gleaned. There are several important themes for our purposes here: 1) The fourfold of
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earth, sky, divinities, and mortals 2) Dwelling, 3) Staying/gathering/bringing near, and 4)
Preserving and man as the “shepherd of Being,”
The Fourfold
Heidegger’s “Fourfold” is comprised of “earth,” “sky,” “divinities,” and
“mortals.” According to Heidegger,
Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and
water, rising up into plant and animal…The sky is the vaulting path of the sun, the
year’s season’s and their changes, the light and dusk of day, the gloom and glow
of night, the clemency and inclemency of the weather, the drifting clouds and the
blue depth of the ether…The divinities are the beckoning messengers of the
godhead, the god appears in his presence or withdraws into his concealment…The
mortals are the human beings. They are called mortals because they can die. To
die means to be capable of death as death. Only man dies, and indeed continually,
as long as he remains on earth, under the sky, before the divinities…When we
speak of [any one of these], we are already thinking of the other three along with
them, but we give no thought to the simple oneness of the four.53
Heidegger’s “Fourfold,” is so rich with possible interpretations that it is simply
not possible to give a fully adequate treatment of it here. For our purposes, it is the last
sentences of the above cited passage that bear perhaps the greatest importance. The
“four” of the fourfold are together in a “simple oneness.” That is, one cannot think of
any of these “four” in isolation from the other three. “The simple oneness of the four we
call the fourfold.”54
The point of this sentence has already been expressed above. For instance, in
QCT, one is to “pay heed” to the questioning way by not fixing our “attention upon
isolated sentences and topics.” The same goes for the fourfold, and, perhaps, for the
same “reasons.” To “pay heed” is to read “fourfold” with a stress on the –fold.
Obviously then, a reading that instead stresses the four- will be one that fixes attention
53
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“upon isolated sentences and topics,” having an atomistic interpretive approach in
common with such attention. Such is precisely the state of affairs in which
Our thinking has of course been long accustomed to understate the essence of the
thing. The consequence, in the course of Western thought, has been that the thing
is represented as an unknown X to which perceptible qualities are attached. From
this point of view, everything that already belongs to the gathering essence of this
thing does, of course, appear as something that is afterward read into it.55
Dwelling
But our interests in this section regard the “thing” and what it is to be a “thing.”
The thingly nature of the thing is essentially tied to what it is, for Heidegger, to dwell.
[D]welling itself is always a staying with things. Dwelling, as preserving, keeps
the fourfold in that with which mortals stay: in things…Staying with things,
however, is not something attached to this fourfold preservation as a fifth
something. On the contrary: staying with things is the only way in which the
fourfold is accomplished at any time in simple unity. Dwelling preserves the
fourfold by bringing the essence of the fourfold into things. But things
themselves secure the fourfold only when they themselves as things are let be in
their essence.56
“Building is really dwelling.” This statement is in line with what we said above
regarding the poetical essence of the “thing.” As with the fourfold, we must question this
statement in terms of an investigation into “that” which unites the two, that from out of
which “Building as dwelling unfolds into the building that cultivates growing things and
the building that erects buildings.”57
Secondly, says Heidegger, the event where dwelling “recedes behind the manifold
ways in which dwelling is accomplished, the activities of cultivation and construction,” is
essentially connected with the event where these activities “claim the name of bauen,
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building, and with it the matter of building, strictly for themselves.”58 We can see a
strong connection here between this recession of dwelling behind building and humans
as “lord of the Earth.” Humans subdue dwelling to their own projects, (seemingly)
lording over dwelling.
Third, and on the basis of the first two examples,
However hard and bitter, however hampering and threatening the lack of homes
remains, the proper plight of dwelling does not lie merely in a lack of houses.
The proper plight of dwelling is indeed older than the world wars with their
destruction, older also than the increase in the earth’s population and the
condition of the industrial workers. The proper dwelling plight lies in this, that
mortals ever search anew for the essence of dwelling, that they must ever learn to
dwell.59
Staying/Gathering/Bringing Near
How does one “learn to dwell?” “What” is “it” that must be learned? We find
that like the four of the onefold fourfold, building and dwelling, challenging and lettingbe, there is “something” which both dwelling and “staying/gathering/bringing near” share
in common.
In his investigation of the jug, Heidegger says:
Our language denotes what a gathering is by an ancient word. That word is:
thing. The jug’s presencing is the pure, giving gathering of the one-fold fourfold
into a single time-space, a single stay. The jug presences as a thing. The jug is
the jug as a thing. But how does the thing presence? The thing things. Thinging
gathers. Appropriating the fourfold, it gathers the fourfold’s stay, its while, into
something that stays for a while: into this thing, that thing.60
There is thus a poetic essence to “thing,” “thinging,” “gathering,” “staying,” and
“bringing near.” Heidegger demonstrates the thingly and thinging nature of the thing
through his depiction of the “bridge” that, as thing, “gathers the earth and landscape
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around the stream.” It is thus “a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such
a way that it allows a site for it.”61 The identity of the thing is constituted out of a
relationship with the site it opens up through its presencing. It is important to note
Heidegger’s stress on the way such gathering happens, rather than that this or that action
“is” or “is not” a gathering.
We have taken note of Heidegger’s depiction of the technological: that it results
in an “objectless” and “uniform distancelessness.” And yet his language: that the “thing
things” and “thinging gathers,” seems to suggest that there is indeed something that the
thing does on its own. Is this statement in conflict with the nature of poiesis? This is
one reading, but it is not the only one.

Man as the “shepherd” of Being
That “Man is the shepherd of Being” is certainly one of Heidegger’s most famous
and significant statements. Heidegger says man is “thrown” from Being itself into the
truth of Being so that he might “guard the truth of Being, in order that beings might
appear in the light of Being as the beings they are.”62 To be a guard is, for Heidegger, to
allow things to appear in the light of being. Guarding and shepherding, then, is
allowance of the poetic, as in gathering, preserving, and the bringing-near of the four- in
the fourfold. “To spare and preserve,” says Heidegger, “means to take under our care, to
look after the fourfold in its essence.”63 Further,
Since Being is never the merely precisely actual, to guard being can never be
equated with the task of a guard who protects from burglars a treasure stored in a
building. Guardianship of Being is not fixated upon something existent. The
61
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existing thing, taken for itself, never contains an appeal of Being. Guardianship is
vigilance, watchfulness for the has-been and coming destiny of Being, a vigilance
that issues from a long and ever-renewed thoughtful deliberateness, which heeds
the directive that lies in the manner in which Being makes its appeal. In the
destiny of Being, there is never a mere sequence of things one after another: now
frame, then world and thing; rather, there is always a passing by and simultaneity
of the early and late.64
We have been following a trace whose source lies in the mystery of poetic coming
to presence. The “simultaneity” mentioned in the last sentence of the above passage
should bring to mind the apparent tension between the “thinging” of the thing and
poiesis: “apparent,” precisely because the regarded presence or absence of the tension is
grounded in a particular interpretation of Being.
But in order to understand this simultaneity of tension and no-tension with regard
to the relationship between thinging and poiesis, it is necessary to proceed one “step”
further.
D. Responding and Releasement
We are questioning Being. Such questioning is “thinking.” To “think Being” can
mean to think about a thing called “Being”: an object for thought. This definition, like
Heidegger himself says so many times, is “correct,” but it is not the only one. Heidegger
says
To think “Being” is to respond to the appeal of its presencing. The response
stems from the appeal and releases itself toward that appeal. The responding is a
giving way before that appeal and in this way an entering into its speech. But to
the appeal of Being there also belongs the early uncovered has-been (aletheia,
logos, phusis) as well as the veiled advent of what announces itself in the possible
turnabout of the oblivion of Being (in the keeping of its nature).65
The same “simultaneity of early and late” appears here as well. In turn, QCT
closes with an examination of a line by Holderlin: “Where the danger is, grows/ The
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saving power also.”66 There is an essential relationship between what it is to “shepherd”
Being and what it is to “hear” the “appeal of Being.” To hear, as shepherd, is to respond
to a call (from Being) to somehow take part in the “turnabout of the oblivion of Being.”
This “oblivion of Being” is the objectless and uniform-distancelessness of the
technological mode, a mode where the object “no longer stands over-against us,” where
the fourfold is no longer gathered in the sense of the –fold, but rather “mastered” as
isolated grid components in the service of humans as “lord of the earth.”
Humans think, but their thoughts are not their own. To claim thoughts as
possessions is akin to hoarding a treasure – the “treasure” of which the mistaken-hearer
of the appeal of Being attempts to guard from burglars. “Thinking, in contrast, lets itself
be claimed by Being so that it can say the truth of Being. Thinking accomplishes this
letting.”67
Thus, thinking, in the turnabout, is released from the enslavement of being an
effect of which humans as such are the cause. It is not something that humans make.
Such a notion is a direct expression of the technological “lording” mode in which
objectlessness replaces the self-standing poetic nature of things as such. Ironically it is
this objectlessness that makes possible the claiming of individual humans of thinking as
their own creation and right: where naming rules the named.
“Naming rules the named” in the same way “science encounters only what its
kind of representation has admitted beforehand…”68 The scientific and technological
mode of being is characterized by a prior rule giving that sets into order by way of
revealing that which is subsequently ordered as having always been that way: it brings
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forth the ordering act as rather an apprehension of the “way things are.” But “more
important than instituting rules is that man find his way to his abode in the truth of Being.
This abode first yields the experience of something we can hold on to. The truth of Being
offers a hold for all conduct.”69
The offered “hold” is not a set of rules. If there is an essential link between
“thing,” poiesis, “shepherd,” and releasement, it is the mutual requirement by all of these
of responding. Responding means listening to the call of Being: a turning of my attention
(and priorities) beyond myself as an isolated subjectivity. It is a move away from the
“lording” tendencies of humans who, thrown into technological revealing, reveal the
“meaning” of existence in terms of means-end production figures, always having the
“data” to back them up.70 With this mode of thinking – the thinking of Being –
correctness is no longer the hallmark of rightness:
As a response, thinking of Being is a highly errant and in addition a very destitute
matter. Thinking is perhaps, after all, an unavoidable path, which refuses to be a
path of salvation and brings no new wisdom. The path is at most a field path, a
path across fields, which does not just speak of renunciation but already has
renounced, namely, renounced the claim to a binding doctrine and a valid cultural
achievement or a deed of the spirit. Everything depends on the step back, fraught
with error, into the thoughtful reflection that attends the turnabout of the oblivion
of Being. The step back from the representational thinking of metaphysics does
not reject such thinking, but opens the distant to the appeal of the trueness of
Being in which the responding always takes place.71
We can ask, again: what is responding? It is hoped that by now, however, we
know not to expect a “correct” answer in the form of a strict delineated concept offered
solely to satisfy and fill the space of this “what.” We also know, in turn, that responding,
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releasement, and poetic revealing are not accomplished solely by human doing: to say so
is to remain in the technological mode of humans as “lord.”
Heidegger says “A mere shift in attitude is powerless to bring about the advent of
the thing as thing, just as nothing that stands today as an object in the distanceless can
ever be simply switched over into a thing.”72 Neither the revealing of the thing as it is in
itself, nor the shift in attitude necessary to allow such revealing to occur, is something we
can do on our own. Although to say so seems to leave the matter dangling in uncertainty,
perhaps everything that has been said so far regarding correctness and certainty will
provide the patience needed to wait for a more satisfactory illumination in the third
chapter.73
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Chapter Two: Deep Ecology
A. Introduction
Ecology is “the scientific study of the interrelationships among organisms and
between organisms, and between all aspects, living and non-living, of the
environment.”74 The origin of the term is not completely solid, though it has been traced
to the nature writings of Theophrastus (c372-287 BC). The etymology of the term
derives from the Greek word oikos meaning “household, home, or place to live.”
German zoologist Ernest Haeckel coined it in reference to the relationship between an
animal and its “organic or inorganic environment.” Ecology is thus the study of the
relationships between organisms and their environment (and each other).
On September 3, 1972, at the third World Future Research Conference in
Bucharest, Romania, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, coined the term Deep
Ecology (hereafter referred to as ‘DE’) by differentiating between what he called
“shallow” and “deep” ecological views. The former involve concern for environmental
matters solely insofar as human interests are involved. Naess labeled this “standard view
of conservationists” shallow ecology, which he describes as “mainly an anthropocentric,
individualistic, Western movement, concerned with the health and affluence of people in
the developed countries.”75 A shallow focus is narrow, but not completely unethical.
“The limitation of the shallow movement is not due to a weak or unethical philosophy,”
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says Naess, “but to a lack of explicit concern with ultimate aims, goals, and norms.”76
The word “shallow” nevertheless has an understandably derogatory tone.
David Rothenberg states in the Introduction to Naess’s Ecology, Community,
Lifestyle,
More precisely, [DE] is the utilization of basic concepts from the science of
ecology – such as complexity, diversity, and symbiosis – to clarify the place of
our species within nature through the process of working out a total view.77
DE does not, as a reaction to shallowness, constitute a rejection of social activism.
Naess himself states that in DE, “unlike academic philosophy, decisions and actions
count more than generalities.”78 But nor does it reject philosophical reasoning: it
combines abstract philosophical formulations with prescriptions for concrete action. The
focus of action in shallow ecology is at issue.
DE is an ecological philosophy or ecophilosophy. Naess’s word is “ecosophy.”
The combination of abstract reasoning and concrete action hints at DE’s symbiotic and
non-exclusionary character. The science of ecology is observational or descriptive,
whereas an ecosophy is action oriented. “Without an ecosophy, ecology can provide no
principles for acting, no motive for political and individual efforts.”79
Naess himself calls his ecosophy ‘Ecosophy T’, thereby distinguishing it from
other ecopsophies. The possibility of more than one ecosophy reflects the diversity of
organisms and phenomena in the ecopshere:
Rather than talking about reality or the world, ecosophical thinking proceeds in
terms of nature, and humanity’s relation to nature. An attempt is made to defend
our spontaneous, rich, seemingly contradictory experience of nature as more than
76
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subjective impressions. They make up the concrete contents of our world. This
point of view, as every other ontology, is deeply problematic – but of great
potential value for energetic environmentalism in opposition to the contemporary
near-monopoly of the so-called scientific world-view.80
A “total view” is to replace the narrow and limited attitudes of citizens in modern
industrial societies. “Total view” corresponds with “the relational, total-field image” of
self presented by DE.

Ecocentrism replaces anthropocentrism: as such, DE is a

“rejection of the man-in-environment image,”81 doing away with the strictly atomistic
view of the self, or ‘self’ according to the technological worldview.
Organisms [are] as knots in the biospherical net or field of total relations. An
intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to
the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the relation, A
and B are no longer the same thing. The total-field dissolves not only the man-inenvironment concept, but every compact thing-in-milieu concept – except when
talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication.82
A “total view” is identification with not just one’s own species, but all forms of
life. Further, the meaning of “self-realization” is widened out of its typically selfcentered rendering to include other species, the environment and the ecopshere. Thus, as
one cares for the environment, one cares for oneself.
DE endorses “not a slight reform of our present society, but a substantial
reorientation of our whole civilization.”83 There is an intrinsic connection between DE
and nonviolence (in the Ghandian sense): as such, violent revolutions are not consistent
with its purpose. “The direction is revolutionary, the steps are reformatory.”84 DE aims
at changing the dominant worldview and social structure of modernity. The reasons
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behind the alignment between DE and nonviolent change become clearer upon
consideration of self-widening, explained below.85 We can say for now that the
relationship between DE and nonviolence mirrors the symbiosis expressed through
organic relations (between beings or between being and environment) within the total
ecosystem.
Naess and Sessions formulated the basic principles of any ecosophy. Their goal
was to represent the “basics,” which are “meant to express important points which the
great majority of supporters accept, implicitly or explicitly, at a high level of
generality.”86 These principles “guide those who believe ecological problems cannot be
solved only by technological ‘quick-fix’ solutions,” in achieving effective non-violent
direct action in the direction of fundamental change.87
The generality of the points allows for specifics to be worked out on individual
bases: the point is to provide a tool for realizing commonality, rather than a calculus of
differentiation. This eight-point platform is:

1.

2.
3.
4.
5.

The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth
have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, intrinsic worth).
These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world
for human purposes.
Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of
these values and are also values in themselves.
Humans have no right to reduce this richness except to satisfy vital
needs.
The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a
substantially smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human
life requires a smaller human population.
Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive,
and the situation is rapidly worsening.
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6.
7.

8.

Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic
economic, technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state
of affairs will be deeply different from the present.
The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an
increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound
awareness of the difference between bigness and greatness.
Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly
or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.88

Point number one is an ecosophical nexus. The good of any non-human entity is
independent of our valuations of it (e.g., for profits, resources, or other strictly human
purposes). The other points flow out of and unite around this conception. Additional
viewpoints range from political (increased self-determination and diminished
centralization of governmental structures)89to personal (the “profound human ignorance
of biospherical relationships,”90 stress on a humble, questioning attitude) to transpersonal
(peace and nonviolence91, concern for future generations). “Profound ignorance” is not
an assertion of human stupidity. It rather signifies an open and humble attitude,
expressed by Naess where he says “the smaller we come to feel ourselves compared to
the mountain, the nearer we come to participating in its greatness. I do not know why
this is so.”92
The ecological movement relies upon the results of research in ecology and more
recently in conservation biology…But to the great amazement of many, the
scientific conclusions are often statements of ignorance: ‘We do not know what
long-range consequences the proposed interference in the ecosystem will beget,
88
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so we cannot make and hard and fast changes.’ Only rarely can scientists predict
with any certainty the effect of a new chemical on even a single small
ecosystem…The study of ecosystems makes us conscious of our ignorance.93

B. The Ethical Landscape of Deep Ecology
One possible take on deep ecological ethics involves seeing it as an extension of
traditional ethics. The range of ethical consideration is widened from its traditionally
human focus to include animals (as in Singer), plants (as in Taylor), and ecosystems
(DE). But there is more than one take on the meaning of “widening” as well. One could
view it as a linear extension or broadening of the meaning of patient, so that more
possible recipients of the effects of an action are considered: the typical take on animal
rights views it as an avoidance of speciesism: not withholding any right from animals that
we could not justifiably withhold from humans.
But the linear model still remains human centered, thus falling under the
“shallow” categorization of ecology. DE rather approaches ethical expansion from the
side of the agent: the agent as subject is expanded to include animals, plants and
ecosystems as itself: but not in a selfish, human centered, or “me”-oriented sense. The
ethical patient is not separate. Self is originally wide.
The intensity of identification with other forms of life depends on milieu, culture,
and economic conditions. The ecosophical outlook is developed through an
identification so deep that one’s own self is no longer adequately delimited by the
personal ego or organism. One experiences oneself to be a genuine part of all life.
Each living being is understood as a goal in itself, in principle on equal footing
with one’s own ego. It also entails a transition from I-it attitudes to I-thou
attitudes – to use Buber’s terminology…This does not imply that one acts, wishes
to act, or consistently can act in harmony with the principle of equality. The
statements about biospheric equality must be merely taken as guidelines.94

93
94

Ibid. 26-27
Ibid. 174; author’s emphasis

33

The concept of intrinsic value is extremely important for ecophilosophical
purposes. Widened consideration entails recognition of others as goal-directed and
striving to flourish, in contrast to a purely instrumental value that is human centered and
ascribes value to non-human life only insofar as there is some benefit to be had for
humans by doing so. Traditionally, intrinsicality and instrumentality are kept
substantially separate. In the total-field view of DE, this and other “separations” are not
necessarily eliminated per se, but softened and opened.
Perceptive readers will notice here a parallel to Kantian ethical terminology: ends
(intrinsic) and means (instrumental). Both formulations of the Categorical Imperative
show up in Naess’s work. The first is in a discussion of technology where he asks
“…should we not subscribe to the following norm: ‘Choose a level of standard of living
such that you realistically may desire that all fellow humans reach the same level if they
want’?”95 Naess mentions humans explicitly, here, but it is not hard to realize that if this
norm were to be consistently and universally sought, the well-being of non-human
organisms would be substantially increased.
The second formulation appears within an extension of Naess’s above-quoted
discussion of self-widening, which simultaneously expands upon the “softening” of the
“substantial” divide between intrinsicality and instrumentality:
Even under conditions of intense identification, killing occurs. The Indians in
California, with their animistic mythology, were an example of equality in
principle, combined with realistic admissions of their own vital needs. When
hunger arrives, brother rabbit winds up in the pot. ‘A brother is a citizen, but oh,
so temptingly nutritious!’ – This example is too easy: the complicated rituals
which surround the hunt in many cultures illustrate how closely people feel bound
to other beings, and how natural it is to feel that when we harm others, we also
harm ourselves. Non-instrumental acts develop into instrumental…Immanuel
Kant’s maxim ‘You shall never use another person only as a means’ is expanded
95
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in Ecosophy T to ‘You shall never use any living being only as a means.’…A lack
of identification leads to indifference.96
Intrinsicality and instrumentality are interdependent in the manner of organisms in
symbiosis. This is the conception of “identification” in DE. To substantiate it into a
statement of pure sameness is to fall into a wider atomism, but atomism nonetheless. By
contrast, identification in DE is fluid and dynamic, similar to how things are rooted in
Logos in the Heraclitean conception of the term: things have identities, but not strictly out
of themselves as individuals qua individuals. In the same way, neither ought and is, nor
value and fact, are substantially distinct.
Our opinions as to what is or ought to be done are highly dependent upon our
hypotheses as to how the world is organized. Applied to ecological relationships,
this implies that our norms are dependent upon our beliefs regarding the
interdependency relations within the biosphere.97
Interdependency relations entail as well an interdependency of self-realization(s).
A identifies with the other (B) to such a degree that “when B seeks a just treatment, A
supports the claim.”98 All of the interdependencies cited thus far point again to something that unites them. This “thing” is no substantial thing: it is more mysterious than
any neatly boxed or categorized “it.”
These considerations set the stage for observing another Kantian parallel in
Naess’s ecosophy: of “beautiful actions,” expressed where Naess states: “Where
solidarity and loyalty are solidly anchored in identification, they are not experienced as
moral demands; they come out of themselves.”99 Such actions serve as an alternative to
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both selfishness and altruism, since both revolve around a narrow conception of ethical
actor or agent.
Inspired by Kant, one may speak of ‘beautiful’ and of ‘moral’ action. Moral
actions are motivated by acceptance of a moral law, and manifest themselves
clearly when acting against inclination. A person acts beautifully when acting
benevolently from inclination. Environment is then not felt to be something
strange or hostile which we must unfortunately adapt ourselves to, but something
valuable which we are inclined to treat with joy and respect, and the
overwhelming richness of which we are inclined to use to satisfy our vital
needs.100
A conception of ethics beyond both selfishness and altruism obviously involves
an other-than-normal conception of value. DE entails a move away from both atomistic
and anthropocentric value conceptions. “It is misleading terminology to maintain that
values humanly conceived as valuable are such for human beings.”101 This difference is
linked to both to interdependency relations between is/ought, intrinsic/instrumental and
I/thou, as well as the self-emergence of beautiful actions.
Actually, both interdependence and self-emergence take part in a mirroring of
ecosystemic reality: the latter is explicitly related to intrinsic value in that something with
‘a value of its own’ has this value out of itself – but not, as discussed above, out of itself
qua-individual. It is self-emergence in a similar sense to Heidegger’s notion of phusis as
a mode of aletheia.102 Not only is such a conception more dynamic (and thus closer to
ecosystemic reality): it provides a deeper account of the valuable than anything possible
out of a traditionally atomistic ethical framework.
We have seen that what was originally perceived as conceptual dichotomies with
substantially separated elements gets re-worked in DE into interdependency relations.
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Such goes not only for particular conceptual pairs within ethics and ontology as separate
fields, but for ethics and ontology themselves:
It is, I think, important in the philosophy of environmentalism to move from ethics
to ontology and back. Clarification of differences in ontology may contribute
significantly to the clarification of different policies and their ethical basis…In an
analysis that begins with concrete contents, the is-ought and fact-value
dichotomies don’t look quite as they did from where Hume started, namely as
factual and value affirmations…J. Baird Callicott (1982) says that ‘ecology
changes our values by changing our concepts of the world and of ourselves in
relation to the world. It reveals new relations among objects which, once
revealed, stir our ancient centers of moral feeling.’ (p. 174) The stirring is part of
a gestalt, and as such not to be isolated from the objects.103
What is the consequence of this claim for an ethic (i.e. normative system)? The
point is not novel: “the validity of norms depends upon the validity of non-normative
assumptions, theories, postulates, and observations.”104 For this reason, it is important to
articulate the connection between stated norms (ethics) and the ontological claims or
assumptions from which they are apparently derived. Derivation, of course, is here
grounded in interaction and interconnectedness; it is not just a one-way extraction.
Connections need to be articulated. When such articulation is neglected, “each norm
tends to be taken as absolute ultimate. This reduces or eliminates the possibility of
rational discussion.”105
This new relation to the world, based in ecosystemic interdependence, constitutes
a move away from instrumentality. “It is most advantageous to the ecological movement
that as few as possible norms should be purely instrumental.”106 DE’s critique of
instrumentality opens the way for an account of technology, the topic of the following
section.
103

Naess and Rothenberg, Ecology, 67
Ibid. 43
105
Ibid. 43-44
106
Ibid. 76
104

37

C. Deep Ecology and Technology
Naess writes, concerning our societal role in the global community, “No matter
which one of the great philosophies one considers to be valid, our current role would be
evaluated negatively.” A role in which environmentalism takes precedence, however,
“has no philosophical system to fear.”107 The issue for us is the seeming negativity
towards technology of this hypothetical evaluation. It’s important to keep the deep
ecological explication of value (from the previous section) in mind through what follows.
Much of Heidegger’s take on technology is relevant here. Like Heidegger, Naess
laments a world in which the tool has become the owner. “The cog wheels have brought
us into the very machinery we thought was our slave,” says Naess, sounding a lot like
Heidegger speaking of humans as standing reserve.108 Further,
The technological developments in modern industrial societies have resulted in
continuous pressures towards a kind of lifestyle repugnant not only to supporters
of the deep ecology movement but to those in most alternative
movements…Some of the reasons for such a confrontation are fairly obvious:
modern industrial technology is a centralizing factor, it tends towards bigness, it
decreases the area within which one can say ‘self-made is well made’, it attaches
us to big markets, and forces us to seek an ever-increasing income. The
administrative technologies are adapted to the physical technologies and
encourage more and more impersonal relations.109
A technological society, it appears, inhibits many of the actions and attitudes
necessary for lifestyle consistent with ecosystemic processes. Diversity is superceded by
centralization, calculated bigness replaces a deeper greatness, instrumental justifications
for production replace self-making the self-emergence of life and personal relationships
take second place to an impersonal social structure in which competition outweighs
community, openness, and a deep appreciation of the other.
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The nature of competition is peculiar in itself. A competitive society has the
appearance of diversity, but upon closer inspection, reveals itself to the one who probes
as a rather homogenous state of affairs. Competition is a driving force towards
centralization. Not only that: once competition becomes a value to a society (as in the
United States, where competition is all too often held to be the actualization of
Jeffersonian democracy), alienation and elitism result, as each individual individualizes
himself against the other: the other becomes a possible hindrance to personal prestige.
As far as the relationship between competition and production is concerned, one
need only think of the shift Heidegger discusses from techne to manufacturing. One
needs only to think of the difference between specialized craftworks (e.g. no two
sculptures exactly alike) and the Fordian calculation of individual component
constructions on an assembly line: productivity and efficiency take precedence –
meditative sculpting is a hindrance to high profits. That one does it fast is more
important than doing it well: machines and computers are careful for the workers. As a
result, workers work for the machines.110
Centralization is not a simply domestic factor. It functions on the global level
as well. Naess asks “When a technical advance is made in a leading industrial country, is
it natural that the thousands of cultures and sub-cultures on this globe ultimately adapt
themselves to one group’s ‘progress’?”111 The ecological equivalent would be all
animals in a watershed community acting like the ducks. Why does this happen? Upon
what assumptions are such actions likely based?
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These questions are difficult to answer, especially in light of the totalizing effect
of technological societies over generations. It is one thing to locate a conscious decision
by a citizen: the moment where she proclaims technical progress as the purpose of life. It
is quite another when such an ideal forms the structure of life into which a person is born,
grows up, and is educated to accept that one who has no money has no life. Heidegger’s
conception of thrownness is one way of getting at this cross-generational totalization.
Something similar perhaps is behind Naess’s comment that “the general trend of modern
technological developments has perhaps not been masterminded by anybody, by any
group or any constellation of humans. It may have developed largely ‘by itself’.”112
If technology has “developed largely ‘by itself’,” it is not to be taken in the same
sense as an organism’s self-development, but rather as a function of a perpetuated
ideology: “a deeply grounded ideology of production and consumption.”113 Technical
progress is often justified in terms of its being useful for culture: think of the
advertisements for cellular phones and cars where the father gets the laboring mother to
the emergency room just in time to save the baby, thanks to his superior satellite network
and his trusty Jeep. In all distortions of the truth, a kernel is necessarily preserved. This
truth is that “Technical progress is never purely technical: the value of technical change is
dependent upon its value for culture in general.”114
Such advertisements amount to praising the corporations who provide these
services. The hidden shift from corporations serving culture to humans in service of
corporations is certainly at issue. As Naess writes:
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The degree of self-reliance for individuals and local communities diminishes in
proportion to the extent a technique or technology transcends the abilities and
resources of the particular individuals or local communities. Passivity,
helplessness, and dependence upon ‘megasociety’ and the world market
increase.115
There is a striking correspondence between technocracy and hedonistic
philosophy. Our dependence on corporate technological advancements colors our
pleasure and leisure time, however, to the degree that most people assume that these must
be purchased. The assumption is widespread that, without money, there can be neither
leisure nor pleasure. A core tenet of DE is the adoption of what Naess calls “voluntary
simplicity.” Obviously, the less I depend upon purchasable gadgets for my leisure and
pleasure, the less I have to work to pay bills, and the more leisure time (and pleasure
time) I have available to me: which is the point of going to work in the first place. DE
stresses the fact that people need much less than they believe: but such an idea, though
good for individuals, is bad for corporations and markets. The advertising industry was
perhaps developed for the purpose of influencing citizens to buy more than they actually
need..
DE stresses a redefinition of the meaning of “progress” from increasing GNP to
life quality. There is data backing up the need for such a redefinition. In the United
States, the number of people describing themselves as “very happy” dropped from 35%
in 1957 to 30% in the mid 1990’s, even though the same period witnessed a doubling of
income per capita.116 There is no direct correlation between material wealth and overall
well-being, as many advertising campaigns would have us believe.
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Naess characterizes our present industrialized society as a “technocracy” in which
people are “more occupied with subordinate ends (buildings) over fundamental ones
(homes).”117 Heidegger’s distinction between building and dwelling certainly comes to
mind here. Concern solely with building arises from an instrumental filtering of nature
into means-ends production frameworks, whereas dwelling is a preservation of essence.
The parallel in Naess is “self-emergence” and “intrinsic value.”
The more the ability to dwell on intrinsic value diminishes, the faster
consciousness turns from immediate experience to planning for the coming time.
Although the intrinsic values are ostensibly still the central themes, the
procurement of effective of effective means is the principle occupation. The
undesirable consequences of this become more and more aggravated as the
individual consumer has less and less to do with production. The techniques are
‘improved’ constantly, requiring great sacrifices of time and energy. Unnoticed,
the time spent upon goals withers away. The headlong rush after means takes
over: the improvements are illusory.118
There is no inherent price tag on nature or human beings. “Cost-benefit analysis
breaks down in the case of rights.”119 What is the price of breaking your arm? Such a
situation drives the point home. The “breakdown” occurs due to the link between value
and self-emergence discussed in the previous section. That which is inherently valuable
in itself cannot at the same time be solely instrumentally valuable. There is no absolute
separation between ontology and ethics. Likewise, there can be no separation between
technical proliferation and its ethical consequences. Technological progress does not
occur ‘in a vacuum.’
A critical attitude towards technology seems to involve a suggestion towards the
necessity of action and change. But upon what basis? There are two issues: 1) Such
change is possible; 2) Such change should occur. Both of these are entailed by Naess’s
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statement that “Contrary to expectation, urbanized life has not killed human fascination
with free nature, but only made the access more difficult and promoted mass tourism.”120
The situation is not hopeless. But an objection to the vagueness or lack of prescriptions
could be raised: ‘what exactly are we to do about this?’
What demand is the deep ecologist expected to satisfy with this question? Some
demands are consistent with nature, and can thus be met; others are not. Naess writes:
The Future in Our Hands is actively associating consciousness and lifestyle
change with direct action. Attempts at a change in lifestyle cannot wait for the
implementation of policies which render such change more or less required. The
demand for a ‘new system’ first is misguided and can lead to passivity. The same
applies to personal lifestyle change first, and consequent isolation from political
action. These two changes must proceed simultaneously. Changes have to be
made from the inside and from the outside, all in one.121
Fine: but for the seeker of more explicit answers, some statements can still be
offered. Society “cannot adopt different aims and values unless the way of production is
altered.”122 One obvious way to achieve production shift in an originally demand-driven
economy is through demand shift. The power of boycotts and product information
campaigns derives from the original rootedness of market progress in demand.
Ironically, so too does the advertising industry. But there are many ways to achieve such
a shift. The next section investigates more in depth the common qualities the any deep
ecological activism will share insofar as it qualifies as an ‘ecosophy’.
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D. The Eight Point Platform
The following section is a commentary on the principles of Naess’s Eight Point
Platform. Each point is considered in its own light. But the inter-connectedness of the
points (again, flowing from the first point) is worth notice.

The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value in
themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent
of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes.
In his essay “The Viable Human,” Thomas Berry writes
The basic orientation of the common law tradition is toward personal rights and
toward the natural world as existing for human use. There is no provision for
recognition of nonhuman beings as subjects having legal rights. To the
ecologists, the entire question of possession and use of the earth, either by
individuals or by establishments, needs to be profoundly reconsidered. The naïve
assumption that the natural world exists solely to be possessed and used by
humans for their unlimited advantage cannot be accepted. The earth belongs to
itself and to all the component members of the community.123
Berry points out the mistaken nature of the assumption that the earth exists solely
for present human use. Present social and economic reality reveals humans as selfproclaimed privileged possessors of natural (animal, plant, and mineral resources), and
even other people, as revealed through the many instances throughout history of slave
trading, sweat-shop labor, and harsh working conditions – pure examples of Heidegger’s
standing reserve. As possessors, the earth, along with its inhabitants and resources,
become possessions – things owned and present for consumptive use.
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DE challenges the inherent use standpoint, a challenge Naess endorses where he
writes, “The earth does not belong to humans.”124 Furthermore, in the deep ecological
approach,
Humans only inhabit the lands, using resources to satisfy vital needs. And if their
non-vital needs come in conflict with the vital needs of nonhumans, then humans
should defer to the latter. The ecological destruction now going on will not be
cured by a technological fix. Current arrogant notions in industrial (and other)
societies must be resisted.125
A fundamental aspect of ‘intrinsic value’ includes allowing “all entities (including
humans) the freedom to unfold in their own way unhindered by the various forms of
human domination.”126 There is a fundamental distinction between vital needs and
created needs (wants): between what we truly need and what we merely think (or are
influenced to think) we need. The former are intrinsic to flourishing, the latter are not
and may, when carried too far, actually hinder flourishing.
Fritjof Capra writes: “The most important task for a new school of ethics will be
to develop a non-anthropocentric theory of value, a theory that would confer inherent
value on non-human forms of life.”127 Intrinsic value, as noted above, does not derive
from the individuality of that particular organism, but is deeper than the individuality of
the individual.

Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are
also values in themselves.
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Naess speaks of a “core democracy in the biosphere.”128 This introduces a
necessary “diversity of both human and non-human life.”129 Diversity lends itself to the
strength of an ecosystem, such as a wild forest, where a greater number of species leads
to greater resilience to disease, more mutual resources for the inhabiting organisms of the
area, and overall ecosystemic integrity. Naess thus formulates “Maximum diversity!
Maxim symbiosis!” as a core representative tenet of the deep ecological approach.
Core democracy refers to much more than the organisms in a single
environmental niche. Change and interference, such as a lightning strike causing a
wildfire in a wooded area, are integral aspects of the biosphere. Nevertheless, we can
assert that the maximization of diversity and symbiosis includes a preservation of
otherness. Rather than deriving nature from the single axiomatic point of human benefit,
DE, encourages maximization of diversity. “What is at issue here is precisely the
question of the integrity of nonhuman species and individuals in terms of their
“otherness” and difference from humans, and a respect for the ongoing integrity of wild
evolutionary processes.”130 The idea is to minimize human instrumental interference as
much as possible, only causing disturbances for vital needs and interests.
Deep Ecology thus involves a move away from viewing the other as “enemy,”
and thus away from the Hobbesian paradigm that the state of nature is
fundamentally hostile to human flourishing – “a state of war with any and all
others.”131
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The preservation of otherness amounts to vastly different circumstances than
current trends towards the humanization of nature. Humbleness and openness replace the
currently dominant attitude which George Sessions calls “arrogance towards nature.”132

Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs.
Current trends in human consumerism are unsustainable, a fact “clearly seen in
the damage done to major elements necessary for the continued well-being of the
planet.”133 When the soil, the air and the water have been extensively depleted, human
needs cannot be fulfilled. On the flip side, the current (too) intense focus on present
fulfillment leads to greater and greater lack of fulfillment for the future generations who
will inherit the effects of our present practices. Gary Gardener notes:
the loss of forests, wetlands, and coral reefs to social decay in the world’s most
advanced nations…warn us of creeping corrosion in the favored development
model of the twentieth century. That model, used by developers as well as
industrial nations, is materials-intensive, driven by fossil fuels, based on mass
consumption and mass-disposal, and oriented primarily toward economic growth
– with insufficient regard for meeting people’s needs. In 1992, the U.N.
Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth Summit) challenged this
model and offered a comprehensive alternative. It called the human family to a
new experience – that of sustainable development.134
Thomas Berry cites unsustainable trends as resulting directly from “a humancentered norm of reality and value.”135 A wider (deeper) view is needed. Again, to say so
is not to be anti-human, but anti-anthropocentric, in the sense that current practices are
based on fundamentally flawed conceptions of both human and non-human nature.
Andrew McLaughlin emphasizes the distinction between vital and non-vital
needs. “This distinction is denied by the consumerism inherent in industrialism. To lose
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sight of it is to become trapped within an endlessly repeating cycle of deprivation and
temporary satiation.”136 Our current consumerist culture, fueled through advertising and
manipulative psychological tactics, puts enormous stress on replacement purchases. A
constant growth economy maintains momentum through constant sales. Long-term
durable goods cut into total sales. Not only that: Deep, long-term satisfaction with
current possessions is actually detrimental to overall economic growth. Today, helping
corporations to increase profits is even equated with American “patriotism,”
demonstrating the fusion of ideology and technology in the interests of a constant growth
economy.

The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially smaller
human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a smaller human
population.
Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the situation
is rapidly worsening.
The Population Explosion by Paul and Anne Ehrlich, holds the following claim:
In short, human numbers and human behavior must be brought into line with the
constraints placed upon Homo sapiens by the limits of Earth and the laws of
nature. People who think those can be ignored or evaded are living in a dream
world. They haven’t reflected on the four million years it took for humanity to
build a population of two billion people, in contrast to the forty-six years in which
the second two billion appeared and the twenty-two years it will take for the
arrival of the third two billion. They have overlooked the most important trend of
our time.137
The issue of population growth is tied directly to deep ecologists’ concern for
future generations. The predominant human focus up to the present has been
reproduction for the survival of the species. Due to vast improvements in nutrition,
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public health (such as hand washing and sanitation), immunization and antibiotics, “what
had been a billion people around 1800 became 1.6 billion in 1900, 2.5 billion by 1950,
and 6.1 billion by 2000.”138 Such exponential growth increases coupled with increases in
consumption (and corresponding waste and pollution) levels, means unchecked
population growth is a real problem, especially for future generations. “We should
collectively recognize that an increase in human numbers is not in the best interest of
humans, much less the rest of life.”139
A call for population reduction is a call for balance. “Humans have modified the
earth over their entire history and will probably continue to do so. At issue is the nature
and extent of such interference.”140
Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,
technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply
different from the present.
Much of the relevance of this point has already been discussed in the previous two
sections on ethics and technology. Due to the lack of a substantial divide between
ontology and ethics, we see justifications for change in the actuality of current affairs.
The burden of proof falls not on environmentalists, but on the perpetuators of
technocratic ideologies: those who claim that material wealth does indeed lead to
happiness, despite massive evidence to the contrary, such as that revealed in the
Worldwatch Institute’s State of The World Report (2002).
Policy changes proceeding from deep-self appeals and concern for future
generations will differ greatly from current present-centered consumer focuses. The

138

Flavin, State of the World Report 2002. 129
Andrew McGlaughlin. “The Heart of Deep Ecology.” 88
140
Arne Naess. “The Deep Ecological Movement: Some Philosophical Aspects.” 69
139

49

currently blurry line between vital needs and mere wants must be clarified. Human rights
will be seen as more than instrumental “rights to…”

The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality (dwelling in
situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard
of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between bigness and
greatness.
When argumentation shifts from short-term to long-term, axioms necessarily shift
as well. Arguments are constructed upon foundational assumptions that are deeper and
broader in terms of ethical consideration: they consider non-humans (and more) as
worthy ethical subjects (considered as possible ethical patients).
In order to uncover deeper assumptions, the deep ecologist asks “deeper
questions.”141 “In DE, we ask whether the present society fulfills basic human needs like
love and security and access to nature, and, in so doing, we question our society’s
underlying assumptions.”142 In America, at present, there exists the strange combination
of an amazingly high number of affluent citizens with staggering rates of depression and
anxiety. Deep ecologists view this correlation as a result of a collective (ideologically
influenced) emphasis on the quantity of possessions - the trademark of an “ultimately
unsatisfying consumerism” 143 - over a simpler and deeper quality of life. McLaughlin
writes:
With a focus on quality, people can see that existing patterns of labor and
consumption are not satisfying, but rather involve chronic dissatisfaction.
Moving towards an appreciation of the quality of life, instead of quantities of
things, leads to an increase in happiness, not a decrease. This is fundamental,
since people are more apt to change when they experience change as
improvement, rather than a grudging submission to necessity. As long as
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environmentalism seems to require only denial and sacrifice, its political
effectiveness will be lessened. Deep Ecology seeks a more satisfactory way of
living, an increase in vitality and joy [author’s emphasis].144
Old paradigms are “inadequate for dealing with the problems of our
overpopulated, globally interconnected world.”145 For the deep ecologist, our crisis is a
“crisis of perception.”146 DE proposes a change not just in policy, and attitude: it goes
deeper by rooting the necessity of these changes in a different philosophical account of
how we as experiencing subjects (actively) perceive (and construct) “reality.”
The paradigm that is now receding has dominated our culture for several hundred
years, during which time it has shaped our modern Western society and has
significantly influenced the rest of the world. This paradigm consists of a number
of ideals and values, among them the view of the universe as a mechanical system
composed of elementary building blocks, the view of the human body as a
machine, the view of life in society as a competitive struggle for existence, the
belief in unlimited material progress to be achieved through economic and
technological growth, an last but not least, the belief that a society in which the
female is everywhere subsumed under the male is one that follows a basic law of
nature. In recent decades, all of these assumptions have been found to be severely
limited and in need of radical revision.147
The already cited link between ethics and ontology, as well as intrinsic value
grounded in self-emergence, all have a role to play as realizations in the progression out
of the traditional mechanistic ontology.

Those who subscribe to the forgoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to
implement the necessary changes.
“The planet that ruled itself directly for the past millennia is now determining its
future through human decision.”148 Deep ecologists recognize the greater value of the
larger community of life. At the same time, they do not take lightly modern human

144

Ibid.
Fritjof Capra. “Deep Ecology: A New Paradigm.” 19
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid. 19-20.
148
Thomas Berry. “The Viable Human.” 10
145

51

claims to technological superiority. Superiority of technological ability is not equivalent
to superiority of the human species itself, or the right to plunder all others. If anything,
this “higher” standpoint places an ethical responsibility upon the humans to preserve the
other specie apparently not so endowed.
Once we grant that a change from an anthropocentric to a biocentric sense of
reality and value is needed, we must ask how this can be achieved and how it
would work. We must begin by accepting the fact that the life community of all
living species is the greater reality and the greater value, and that the primary
concern of the human must be the preservation of this larger community. The
human does have its own distinctive reality and its own distinctive value, but this
distinctiveness must be articulated within the more comprehensive context. The
human ultimately must discover the larger dimensions of its own being within this
community context. That the value of the human being is enhanced by
diminishing the value of the larger community is an illusion, the great illusion of
the present industrial age, which seeks to advance the human by plundering the
planet’s geological structure and all its biological species.149
“The earth belongs to itself and to all the component members of the
community.”150 This attitude is the opposite of one in which, for instance, technology
reveals ecosystems as ordered resource pools set in place specifically for human use. We
thus return to Naess’s fundamental distinction between ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ ecologies.
The “necessary changes” cited above must go deeper than mere modification of industrial
or legislative procedures, or new regulations of the same economic processes.
Efforts are made to mitigate the evils consequent to this industrial-commercial
process by modifying the manner in which these establishments function,
reducing the amount of toxic waste produced as well as developing more efficient
modes of storing or detoxifying waste. Yet all of this is trivial in relation to the
magnitude of the problem. So, too, are the regulatory efforts of the government;
these are microphase solutions for macrophase problems.151
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Naess’s characterization of deep-ecological attitudes as “simple in means but rich
in ends”152points to a move away from top-down inclinations towards ecologicalmindedness. The heart of the critique of shallow ecological approaches to environmental
problems is connected to avoidance of excessive restrictions on a populace in order to
simulate action in the “right” direction. When changes are deep and wide enough, people
act on natural (practically spontaneous) inclinations rather than out of a sense of abstract
duty or the fear of punishment, resulting in “beautiful actions.”
I have an extreme appreciation of what Kant calls “beautiful actions” (good
actions based on inclination), in contrast with actions which are performed out of
a sense of duty or obligation. The choice of the formulation “Self-realization!” is
in part motivated by the belief that maturity in humans can be measured along a
scale from selfishness to an increased realization of Self, that is, by broadening
and deepening the self, rather than being measured by degrees of dutiful
altruism.153
Stress on duty or guilt emphasizes the narrow substantial self which DE seeks to
re-define and overcome. The narrow-self lacks an inclination toward beautiful acts: she
thus needs some form of legislation or regulation to keep her in check. Deep Ecology
aims to move away from coercion and towards self-enlightened actions – actions
motivated from within, and performed through inclination and conviction. A “move
away” from narrowness corresponds directly with the widening of the Self that is the
subject of the following section. Like the Being of beings, the beauty of a beautiful act is
deeper than the particularity of the agent’s identity. The “deeper” quality of such acts
corresponds to a “deeper” self that performs them: the subject of the next section.
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D. Deep Self and Self-Realization
Fritjof Capra says “the most important task for a new school of ethics will be to
develop a non-anthropocentric theory of value.”154 The previous section dealt briefly with
the shortcomings of traditional value theories. Their deficiencies are due to their focus on
the narrow self which deep ecology seeks to widen. DE does not seek to merely extend
traditional ethical frameworks to include non-human beings; these ethical frameworks
themselves are problematic. Their problems are traceable to the narrowness of the self
(subject) that adopts and employs such frameworks – to whom such frameworks make
sense – as well as to presuppositions of substantial objective presence. We are thus
dealing with a shift in perception, rather than a mere extension of the bounds of the same
ethical paradigm.
John Rodman critiques Peter Singer’s ethics in such a light. Rodman calls
Singer’s approach “a kind of zoocentric sentientism,”155 resulting from a mere widening
of anthropocentrism in which “we are asked to assume that the sole value of rain forest
plant communities consists in being a natural resource for birds, possums, veneer
manufacturers, and other sentient beings.”156 Singer’s ethics thus amounts, for Rodman,
to a kind of “moral extensionism” which tends
…to perpetuate the atomistic metaphysics that is so deeply embedded in modern
culture, locating intrinsic value only or primarily in individual persons, animals,
plants, etc. rather than in communities or ecosystems, since individuals are our
paradigmatic entities for thinking, being conscious, and feeling pain…Many of
the attempts to make [such claims to intrinsic value] plausible have, however,
tried to extend the sphere of intrinsic value and therefore of obligatory moral
concern by assimilating (parts of) nature to inappropriate models, without
rethinking very thoroughly either the assumptions of conventional ethics or the
154

Fritjof Capra. “Deep Ecology: A New Paradigm.” 20
John Rodman. “Four Forms of Ecological Consciousness Reconsidered.” Deep Ecology for the 21st
Century. (Boston, Shanbhala Press, 1995). 125
156
Ibid.
155

54

ways in which we perceive and interpret the natural world. It is probably a safe
maxim that there will be no revolution in ethics without a revolution in
perception.157
The transformations within religion are but one strand of the development, to
be sure. But, as with all religious influence, the impact of this transformation has been a
profoundly deep one. Sessions also considers the impact of changes in intellectual
traditions, particularly “the intellectual strand in Greek and Western culture” which
…also exhibits a similar development from early ecocentric animistic Nature
religions, the Nature-oriented (but less animistic) cosmological speculations of the
Pre-Socratics, to the anthropocentrism of the classical Athenian philosophers.
Beginning with Socrates, philosophical speculation was characterized by “an
undue emphasis upon man as compared with the universe,” as Betrand Russell
and other historians of Western philosophy have observed…With the culmination
of Athenian philosophy in Aristotle, an anthropocentric system of philosophy and
science was set in place that was to play a major role in shaping Western thought
until the seventeenth century. Aristotle rejected the Pre-Socratic ideas of an
infinite universe, cosmological and biological evolution, and heliocentrism. He
proposed instead an Earth-centered finite universe wherein humans, by virtue of
their rationality, were differentiated from, and seen as superior to, animals and
plants. Aristotle promoted the hierarchical concept of the “Great Chain of
Being,” in which Nature made plants for the use of animals, and animals were
made for the sake of humans (Politics I.88)158
Such are the roots of the Modern European intellectual tradition, according to
Sessions. It is no surprise that science and the scientific method also follow suit. “The
Scientific Revolution also overturned the age-old organic view of the world as a living
organism and replaced it with a mechanistic clockwork image of the world as a
machine.”159 But most deep ecological theorists will tend to cite Descartes as the Father
of the atomism of self. His mind-body dualism resulted in a view that “only human had
minds (or souls): all other creatures were merely bodies (machines).”160 Descartes firmly
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held to the belief that the new science would make humans the “masters and possessors
of nature.”161
The historian Lynn White, in his essay The Historical Roots of Our Ecological
Crisis, writes of how the beginnings of agricultural technology is marked by a change in
peasant and farmer attitudes towards nature: an onset of a viewpoint in which “Man and
nature are two things, and man is master.”162 Indeed, human attitudes towards ecology
have always been strongly influenced by religion. The Christian defeat of Paganism,
which White calls “the greatest psychic revolution in the history of our culture,”163incited
the reign of “the most anthropocentric religion the world has seen.”164
White’s points serve as a potential spur to a more ecologically conscious Christian
attitude towards nature, to be sure. But outside of the Christian scope, his criticisms
merely point to the same culprit that DE seeks to overcome: the prevalence of a narrow
self. DE seeks to reawaken “the immediate experience humans have of the world” which
is, according to Naess and Sessions, among others,
In terms of manifolds of gestalts, as opposed to the “abstract structures” of reality
we find, for instance, in musical notation and science, or of the world as we are
culturally conditioned to perceive it in terms of individual entities “externally
related” to one another. The latter [is]…the “supermarket view.”…It is
crucial…for members of the Deep Ecology movement to articulate reality in
terms of gestalt perception and ontology, for the competing claims of developers
and environmentalists are often based on egoistic “marketplace” perception, as
opposed to ecological gestalts.165
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The spontaneity of the Gestalt experience is important here. It manifests a tie to
all of the most important aspects of DE: the total-field image, the natural process of
growth, the widening of self and the meaning of deep and wide ethical consideration. It
is why Naess says, quoted above, that “Our problem is not that we lack high levels of
integration (that is that we are immature and therefore joyless) but rather that we glorify
immaturity.” The narrowness of self that DE seeks to overcome through widening is not
an intrinsic narrowness, just as substantial objective presence is not the sole primordial
source of what it is to exist “in” a world. Self is rather intrinsically wide. And this is
why DE is a reaction to non-thought.
The preservationist will admit that there are trees in the forest. But the forest as a
whole is an extremely valuable superordinate gestalt and clearly vulnerable to
“development,” whatever the fraction of the area that is destroyed. An atomistic
view of reality is arrived at by systematically “delearning” the gestalt view which
dominates the child’s experience…Clearly, the economics of industrial societies
are such that most consequences of gestalt ontology are viewed as undesirable.
The atomistic view helps to value the forest in terms of market prices, of extrinsic
parts, and tourism. “A tree is a tree. How many do you have to see?”…The
“delearning process (of not taking spontaneous experiences of superordinate
gestalts seriously) makes life progressively less rich, narrowing it down to a mass
of externally connected details. The more people are adapted to the supermarket
concept, the more dangerous is the appeal to the correctness of majority
opinion…There are many causes of such a mistaken policy, but one cause seems
to be the lack of clear and forceful thinking in terms of wholes, rather than
fragments.166
Deep Ecology approaches the problem from the angle of self. It considers that the
scope and definition of the self may lie at the heart of the problem, rather than merely
assuming our current notions of self as givens. The “lack of clear and forceful thinking
in terms of wholes, rather than fragments” is seen to lie at the heart of “evil” acts. As
narrowness gives way to wideness, immaturity gives way to maturity, isolation gives way
to richness, anthropocentrism gives way to a beautifully diverse world of creatures, and
166
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selfishness gives way to openness, understanding, and love: the qualities ethical theorists
have strived for all along.
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Chapter Three: Deep Ecology and Heideggerian Phenomenology
A. The Ontological Transformation
The previous chapter concludes with a remark that seems to defy the boundary
between ontology and ethics. But this “defiance” is an issue only if such a boundary
really exists. It is clear from our investigations into Heidegger’s thought that Heidegger
aims at a transformation of ontology. Heidegger and Naess clearly agree on the need for
such a transformation.
The assertion of a boundary between ontology and ethics that “really exists” is an
assertion of a substantial boundary, and thus at least implicitly an assertion of substance.
Insofar as the traditional concept of substance is Heidegger’s target, an undermining of
substance is an undermining of substantial categorical boundaries as primordial. That is:
Heidegger and Naess both assert that substance ontology is not primordial ontology.
“Substance,” as Heidegger points out in the Letter on Humanism, is a blanket
translation of ousia. By calling it a “blanket” translation, Heidegger is pointing to the
homogenizing effect of the word “substance” that conceals the deeper meaning of ousia,
“a word that designates the presence of what is present and at the same time, with
puzzling ambiguity, usually means what is present itself.”167 Such “ambiguity” is thus
lost in the translation from ousia to substance. But this loss, we will see, is much more
significant than a mere bad choice of words.
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Analogous to the relation between ousia and substance is the relationship between
the true and the merely correct. Heidegger says in The Question Concerning Technology
that
The correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under
consideration. However, in order to be correct, this fixing by no means needs to
uncover the thing in question in its essence. Only at the point where such an
uncovering happens does the true come to pass. For that reason the merely
correct is not yet the true. Only the true brings us into a free relationship with that
which concerns us from out of its essence.168
The mistake of the technological worldview is a taking of the “correct” for the
“true.” Heidegger says that the correct does indeed fix on something “pertinent” or
“true.” But there is a difference between fixing upon the true and being the true.
Something “correct” adheres to a rule structure. But what is it that makes a structure
“true”? What is the truth of a true structure?
We see an example of the difference between the correct and the true in the
account of Rosa Parks, the African-American woman who refused to move to the back of
the city bus on December 1, 1955 in Montgomery Alabama. Parks took her stand in the
face of the Jim Crow era and its racist laws and regulations, a stand that not surprisingly
resulted in her arrest. Now according to the laws of the day, the arrest of Rosa Parks was
certainly correct. But were the laws upon which such correctness is founded true? To
ask this question is to question beneath the correctness of the matter: an instance of the
deeper questioning that Heidegger and Naess advocate as necessary for the ontological
transformation out a mere correctness that masquerades as the true.
In a similar manner, we are “correct” in defining the “value” of a natural area in
cost-benefit analysis terms. One need only think of the frequent debates between Gifford
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Pinchot, the founder of the “wise-use” movement, and John Muir, the founder of the
Sierra Club and a well-known preservationist. For Pinchot, it was “wise” to use the
resources a land area had to offer, and pointless to let that area be. For Muir, natural
wilderness areas were intrinsically valuable, meaning that the human cost-benefit
conception of the “value” of such areas was not the deepest possible conception.
The technological worldview falters when it treats its own definition of the real as
something more than a particular definition for a particular purpose. That the
technological definition of the real becomes a worldview means that it usurps the
primordial, putting itself in the place of that which underlies it and allows it to come forth
as a perspective at all. But “that” which “allows” is not a thing. Identification of the
primordial with some deeper thing is exactly the substance-ontological mistake targeted
by Heidegger and Naess as the source of the distortion of the modern technological
definition of the real: “the metaphysical determination according to which every being
appears as the material of labor.”169
But if we are to keep our inquiry in line with Heidegger’s inquiry, we cannot stop
at “material for labor.” We must ask: upon what is “the metaphysical determination
according to which every being appears as the material of labor” based? Heidegger
identifies a deeper basis in the mathematical. In Modern Science, Metaphysics, and
Mathematics, he speaks of a will to axiomatic knowledge grounded in unshakeable
propositions. Such serves as the ground-plan for both science and the application of
technological know-how in the modern era.
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Heidegger is careful to point out that “mathematics itself is only a particular
formation of the mathematical.”170 The Greek expression ta mathemata means what can
be learned and, at the same time, what can be taught. In our modern age, especially in
public grade school education, “teaching” is done by assisting students in the
memorization and subsequent recitation of data: facts, formulae, names, dates, important
events. But the Greek conception is different:
Learning is a kind of grasping and appropriating. But not every taking is a
learning…To take means in some way to take possession of a thing and have
disposal over it. Now, what kind of taking is learning? Mathemata – things,
insofar as we learn them…The mathemata are the things insofar as we take
cognizance of them as what we already know them to be in advance, the body as
the bodily, the plant-like of the plant, and so on…[G]enuine learning is therefore
an extremely peculiar taking, a taking where one who takes only takes what one
basically already has. Teaching is a giving, an offering; but what is offered in
teaching is not the learnable, for the student is merely instructed to take for
himself what he already has. If the student only takes over something that is
offered he does not learn. He comes to learn only when he experiences what he
takes as something he himself really already has. True learning occurs only
where the taking of what one already has is a self-giving and is experienced as
such.171
The mathematical eventually became, according to Heidegger, “a project of
thingness which, as it were, skips over things.”172 It does so no doubt due to the idea that
what is taught is what is already known beforehand. Moreover, “the project first opens a
domain where things – i.e., facts – show themselves.”173 That is: upon the basis of the
mathematical as what is already known beforehand, the mathematical becomes a
comportment through which things appear as “this” or “that.” Through the lens of the
mathematical, “things now show themselves only in the relations of places and time
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points and in the measures of mass and working forces. How they show themselves is
prefigured in the project.”174
Heidegger’s examination of the prefiguring of acceptable knowledge concerns the
prefiguring of the “true.” He is not attempting to reveal the application of mathematical
knowledge as faulty: there is far too much evidence in support of the effectiveness of
mathematical method in problem solving, scientific experimentation, and so-called
“mastery” of nature by humans. The problem lies in the assumption that such successes
point to the mathematical comportment as the comportment: as the one way of grasping
the real. To put it another way: while Heidegger clearly acknowledges the correctness of
mathematical method, he doubts the mathematical as primordially true.
This doubt of the primordial nature of mathematical comportment, and of the
scientific and technological worldviews that draw upon the mathematical comportment in
which nature is represented in terms of a uniform grid-like structure of distinct things,
leads Heidegger, in The Thing, to question beneath the mathematical as well:
An independent, self-supporting thing may become an object if we place it before
us, whether in immediate perception or by bringing it to mind in a recollective representation. However, the thingly character of the thing does not consist in
being a represented object, nor can it be defined in any way in terms of the
objectness, the over-againstness, of the object…What in the thing is thingly?
What is the thing in itself? We shall not reach the thing in itself until our thinking
has first reached the thing as thing.175
Heidegger’s deeper inquiry and Naess’s deeper questioning are both challenges to
the modern scientific “way of representing…that pursues and entraps nature as a
calculable coherence of forces,”176 insofar as this way of representing comes to be
regarded as primordial: as the way of representing. Insofar as representation is the
174
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apprehension of a specific object by a specific subject, the challenge is posed towards
representing itself as primordial.
We have already discussed Heidegger’s conception of technology as a mode of
revealing. 177 Revealing, in turn, is that of which technology is a mode. Heidegger
shows the root of the technological in techne which, as belonging to bringing-forth
(poiesis), is a mode of aletheia. As such, “Technology comes to presence [West] in the
realm where revealing and unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens.”178
We thus find ourselves closer to the “root” of our inquiry. What is the “realm” where
aletheia happens?

B. Ereignis
Heidegger’s phenomenology reveals substance ontology as rooted in a prior
ontology. The theory of being (onto-logos) is made possible by an event which itself
cannot be understood in substance ontological terms, and so has to be understood in
terms of event ontology. The ontology prior to substance ontology is thus not an
ontology based upon a substantial or axiomatic ground in the way some think that
Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy is rooted in the certainty of the “I think.”
The prior ontology to which Heidegger is pointing is rather an event ontology. That is: it
is an ontology based upon the event of unconcealment (aletheia) – the “realm” where
aletheia, truth, happens.
In Being and Time, Heidegger distinguishes between the readiness-to-hand and
presence-at-hand of things. The former is a presence in usage, whereas the latter is a
177
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conspicuous presence as object. In the famous example of the workshop, the hammer
only becomes conspicuous when the flow of production in the workshop is disrupted, e.g.
by the breaking of the hammer. Readiness-to-hand is an event that when disrupted leads
to the conspicuous presence-at-hand of the object. “Usage” designates a flow of activity
that yields an objective representation in the event of the disruption of that flow of
activity.
Such “conspicuous presence” means the objective presence (over-againstness) of
the object as object for a subject. The conspicuous object stands over-against the subject
whom upon the event of the disruption not only notices the hammer as an object, but also
herself as disrupted from the previous flowing of activity. The disruption thus results not
only in the objective presence of the object to a subject, but also the objective presence of
the subject to herself. There is thus a mutual objective presence of both object and
subject as distinct, whereas prior to the disruption there was a flow of activity in which
such a distinction was not an issue.
Such mutual objective presence is embedded within a grid framework of objective
representations. This grid framework is the same framework though which the
mathematical comportment renders reality into a “calculable coherence of forces”: the
representation of a set of specific objects by a specific subject. The homogeneity of the
conspicuous objective presence of the present-at-hand and the presence of objects within
the mathematical grid is important for our present discussion in that both the presence-athand of the conspicuous hammer and the objective presence of object to subject (and
subject to itself) are phenomenologically revealed as founded modes of being (not
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primordial). Objecthood is shown to be derivative from a more primordial way of being
which can only be captured in terms of an event ontology.
But what is an event ontology? “Event” is the English word for the German
Ereignis: the opening of a clearing in which entities can appear as “this” or “that.” The
stress is placed on opening and clearing as the activity out of/through which the
appearance of entities as “this” or “that” takes place. It is in these terms that we claim the
event ontology to be prior to any possible substance ontology. In turn, it is upon this
basis that we question beneath any particular “this” or “that.” We are not interested in
the givenness of entities, but rather what brings such givenness about. Our question is a
question of origin.
It is upon such a basis that Heidegger asserts:
The fact that physiology and physiological chemistry can scientifically investigate
man as an organism is no proof that in this “organic” thing, that is, in the body
scientifically explained, the essence of man consists. That has as little validity as
the notion that the essence of nature has been discovered in atomic energy. It
could be that nature, in the face it turns towards man’s technical mastery, is
simply concealing its essence. Just as little as the essence of man consists in
being an animal organism can this insufficient definition of man’s essence be
overcome or offset by outfitting man with an immortal soul, the power of reason,
or the character of a person. In each instance essence is passed over, and passed
over on the basis of the same metaphysical projection.179
“Metaphysical projection” designates any projection insofar as it holds any
particular conception of the being of beings as primordial. It is metaphysical (in the
substance metaphysical sense) if it suggests that a projection is something other than a
projection within a particular cultural context for a particular purpose, e.g. the projection
that claims that the cost-benefit analysis of a wilderness area reveals it as being
primordially a resource pool for humans. Metaphysics, as confined within the grid
179
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representation of objective presence, tends to reduce the underlying event of clearing to
either “outward appearance” of an object to a subject or the projection of a subject, i.e. “a
result of categorical representation on the part of subjectivity. This means that the truth
of Being as the clearing itself remains concealed for metaphysics.”180
Claiming that the event ontology is prior to any substance ontology undermines
the substantial representation of any objective conception as ground. If such
undermining applies to the objective presence of any object for a subject, it must also
apply to the objective presence of a subject to itself. It is upon this basis that Heidegger
rejects the Cartesian founding of metaphysics upon the ‘I think’ (cogito). Thus, if event
ontology is prior to any substance ontology in terms of any objective representation
serving as a substantial-metaphysical ground, event ontology must also be prior to the
traditional metaphysical notion of the subject.
It is for this reason that Da-sein cannot be understood in any
substantial/metaphysical sense. Upon the positing of event ontology as prior to substance
ontology, it becomes necessary to re-define the notion of the subject: this is the reason
why Heidegger abandons the word “subject” in favor of “Da-sein.” Da-sein instead
becomes rendered in terms of event ontology. As such, Da-sein means an openness to the
event of clearing (Ereignis) in which entities appear as “this” or “that,” or, as Thomas
Sheehan puts it, “openness”181 or the “dative of givenness.”182
We might be tempted to ask at this point if, as the “dative of givenness,” Da-sein
is the clearing for Ereignis, or is Ereignis, as the “event of clearing,” the clearing for Da-

180

Ibid. 235
Thomas Sheehan. “Kehre and Eriegnis: A Prolegomenon to Introduction to Metaphysics,” A Companion
to Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphsyics (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001) 5
182
Ibid. 7
181

67

sein? But a more interesting (and relevant) question would be to ask what this question
presupposes. On closer inspection, the question appears to expect satisfaction of one or
the other side of an either-or. But does not such either-or questioning stem from a
rootedness in substance metaphysics in which concepts are distinguished as points on a
grid? That is: in light of what we have established so far with regard to questioning
beneath objective representations rooted in substance metaphysics, does such an either-or
questioning impose an actual demand upon us for an answer?
Heidegger’s phenomenology reveals such mutual exclusivity as a function of the
substance metaphysics to be overcome. If our investigation into the origin of givenness
takes us beneath substance metaphysics, it takes us not only beneath the substantiality of
objective representations, but also beneath the substantiality of rigid distinctions between
such objective representations, e.g. the apparently “substantial” distinction between
ontology and ethics with which we opened the present chapter.
The conception of reality according to an event ontology that is prior to any
substance ontology allows room for the possibility of reciprocity “between” the
givenness of Ereignis and the openness of Da-sein. Thus, the event ontology serves as
the proper theoretical foundation for our assertion of the relatedness between Heidegger’s
phenomenology and Deep Ecology. Naess writes in Ecology, Community and Lifestyle
that ecophilosophy (ecosophy) utilizes “basic concepts from the science of ecology –
such as complexity, diversity, and symbiosis – to clarify the place of our species within
nature through the working out of a total view.”183 The kind of event ontology we have
identified in Heidegger’s writings, not the traditional substance ontology, allows for such
utilization.
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It is important to note that “total” in the sense of Naess’s idea of a “total view” is
not an isolated totality. An isolated totality is a feature of the substance ontology to be
overcome. Rather, read in terms of the event ontology, “The world provides us with a
flood of information, but that which represents itself as living entities is characterized by
a certain natural life, which comes to us as a conviction that identity is inherent only in
the relationships which make up the entity.”184 We may thus assert (at first tentatively)
that symbiosis expressed through ecosystemic relationships is an expression of the
reciprocity between the givenness of Ereignis and the openness of Da-sein. “We are
searching for the nature, in itself, of the openness that surrounds us.”185 We could also
just as easily assert this reciprocity as an expression of organic symbiosis.
The main point of Heidegger’s critique of the substance ontological comportment
is that any particular description of an event reifies that event into a closed conception.
The inability of any particular word to encompass that of which it is an expression is due
to the fact that “a word does not and never can represent anything; but signifies
something, that is, shows something as abiding into the range of its expressibility.”186
That is: there is “something” deeper than any particular word that, though it gets
expressed by/through words, is never contained in any particular word. What “we have
designated by a word never has that word hanging on it like a name plate.”187
Our question is a question of origin. The origin of all objects is itself no object,
just as the being of being is not a being. The inexpressibility of the origin of Ereignis is
thus due to its non-objective character. “Just as the openness of spatial nearness seen
184
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from the perspective of a particular thing exceeds all things near and far, so too is Being
essentially broader than all beings, because it is the clearing itself.”188 Both Ereignis and
Da-sein have this “non-objective” character. As involved in reciprocal relatedness
neither Ereignis nor Da-sein is an isolated object. But neither are Ereignis and Da-sein
completely unified into some kind of absolute totality or oneness. Both “isolated object”
and “absolute totality” are expressions of substance ontology. Thus, the interrelatedness
of Ereignis and Da-sein, expressed in terms of an event ontology, must mean something
other than either “two separate objects related” or “one objective totality” - why Naess
writes:
So, understanding the world as a collection of things with constant or changing
qualities breaks down when one attempts to render it very precise and apply it in
natural scientific or historical research. We must strive for greater familiarity
with an understanding closer to that of Heraclitus: everything flows. We must
abandon fixed, solid points, retaining the relatively straightforward persistent
relations of interdependence. ‘Objective descriptions of nature’ offered by
physics ought to be regarded not as descriptions of nature, but as descriptions of
certain conditions of interdependence, and therefore can be universal, common for
all cultures…Phenomenological viewpoints are valuable for the development of
consciousness of a non-instrumental, non-utilitarian content of the immediate
experience of nature.189
Neither Hediegger’s usage of “Being,” nor Naess’s designation of “wide self” as
the “goal” of Self-Realization designates a closed identity. The openness of Da-sein that
is necessary for the givenness of Ereignis is interrelated with the givenness of Ereignis
“for” which Da-sein, as openness, clears. So too is the individual seeking Selfrealization in terms of the “widening” and “deepening” of Self interrelated with the
ecosystemic “totality” with which the individual identifies. Neither the “individual” nor
the ecosystemic “totality” is an isolated object. As with Da-sein and Ereignis, each
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“needs” the other. To read these conceptions in this way is to read them in an eventontological (rather than substance ontological) way.
The presence of the world to Da-sein, as well as Da-sein’s presence to itself, is
never complete or perfect. As open, Da-sein is “exposed and receptive.” As Sheehan
puts it: “we know only the finite intelligibility of entities.”190 It is thus the finitude of Dasein that opens Da-sein to the givenness of Ereignis. But this is not to say that the
openness is something based solely in such finitude. If we are to stay with event
ontology, we cannot base Da-sein’s opening in any particularity. Even to call this
opening “Da-sein’s” is to risk misinterpretation by slipping back into the assuming
language of substance ontology: why Naess says the characteristics of things are “not
subjective, but, like smell, bound in an interdependent relationship to our conception of
the world. This is what is meant by calling them ‘relational’ – rather than ‘relative’ or
‘subjective’.”191 Finitude is thus not an expression of atomism, but a relational
expression of the unity-in-diversity characteristic of both Heidegger’s event ontology and
Naess’s total view. “Wide self” means “open self” – the realization of Da-sein, in eventontological terms, as openness.
C. Event Ontology and Ethics
Traditional ethics, as based upon the traditional substance ontology, is typically
an instrumentalist ethics, grounded in the mathematical grid-framework out of which the
substance ontology functions. The isolation of fact from value, and the corresponding
distinction between them, is made possible through such a framework. Although this
distinction makes sense according to the architecture of the substance metaphysical grid
190
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framework, Heidegger’s event ontology undermines the inevitability of such a rigid
distinction. This becomes clearer in what follows.
We mentioned how Naess speaks of Kant’s conception of beautiful actions (in
Chapter Two). Such actions are performed not merely out of a strict adherence to rules:
they come out of themselves. The event ontology that gets expressed in Heidegger’s
writings, and especially the concept of Ereignis, provides a basis for an ethics based in
such “beautiful actions” that the traditional substance ontology cannot provide.
“Beautiful actions” express the categoricalness of Kant’s Categorical Imperative. The
Categorical Imperative is not an isolated rule to which an individual subject has a duty.
The Categorical Imperative is truly fulfilled when the “commanded” action comes of
itself. Kant claims that an action performed out of inclination is higher than an action
done merely because one has been ordered to do so, or because one will feel guilty if one
does not perform the action.
Naess’s statement of the need in Deep Ecology to move “from ethics to ontology
and back” is founded upon the interrelatedness of these two disciplines. Normative
values are indeed, as Naess says, based upon non-normative conceptions, although it
remains an open question for our discussion whether such a distinction can ever be truly
made. The event ontology requires an interpretation of this statement that holds the
normative and the non-normative as inextricably interwoven as a unity.
Such interrelatedness is due to the mutual origin of ontology and ethics, fact and
value, Ereignis and Da-sein. In terms of the event ontology, this mutual origin gets
expressed in answers to questions like: what exactly must Da-sein do? What is the
imperative for Da-sein according to the event ontology? Heidegger writes:
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Only so far as man, ek-sisting in the truth of Being, belongs to Being can there
come from Being itself the assignment of those directives that must become law
and rule for man. In Greek, to assign is nemein. Nomos is not only law but more
originally the assignment contained in the dispensation of Being. Only such
dispatching is capable of supporting and obligating. Otherwise, all law remains
merely something fabricated by human reason. More essential than instituting
rules is that man find the way to his abode in the truth of Being. This abode first
yields the experience of something we can hold on to. The truth of Being offers a
hold for all conduct.192
Being is always made possible by an event of truth. Da-sein must be open to
receive this truth. Truth comes by way of an “assignment contained in the dispensation
of Being.” It is upon this event-ontological basis that we get our answer to the question
of what Da-sein must do: Da-sein must both open itself to, and be the clearing for, Being.
The event ontology thus provides an answer to what Da-sein “must” do in noninstrumentalist terms, since instrumentalism, as a function of the substance ontology,
remains in the mathematical realm of objecthood and efficient causality:
Today we are too easily inclined either to understand being responsible and being
indebted moralistically as a lapse, or else to construe them in terms of effecting.
In either case, we bar to ourselves the way to the primal meaning of that which is
later called causality. So long as this way is not opened up to us we shall also fail
to see what instrumentality, which is based on causality, actually is.193
We must now proceed with an investigation into the nature of this “mutual origin”
of ethics and ontology: that which is the origin of all origins – the primal source of the
event ontology.
D. Poiesis
We spoke (in Chapter One) of the distinction between “challenging” and
“bringing forth.” We now have a much clearer conception of the nature of this
distinction. Although they are indeed fundamentally different, they nonetheless remain
related. What is the nature of this relation?
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The word stellen [to set…] in the name Ge-stell [Enframing] not only [suggests
setting upon or] challenging. At the same time it should preserve the suggestion
of another Stellen from which it stems, namely, that producing and presenting
[Her- und Dar-stellen] which, in the sense of poiesis, lets what presences come
forth into unconcealment. This producing that brings forth – e.g., the erecting of a
statue in the temple precinct – and the challenging ordering now under
consideration are indeed fundamentally different, and yet they remain related in
their essence. Both are ways of revealing, of aletheia. In Enframing, that
unconcealment comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern
technology reveals the real as standing-reserve. This work is therefore neither
only a human activity nor a mere means within such activity. The merely
instrumental, merely anthropological definition of technology is therefore in
principle untenable. And it cannot be rounded out by being referred back to some
metaphysical or religious explanation that undergirds it.194
The challenging-ordering is Heidegger’s conceptualization of the violence of
modern technology. We identified this “violence” in the first chapter as a “challenging of
nature out of phase with natural cycles.”195 But it is not just a challenging of nature. We
also challenge ourselves out of phase with our originally expressive nature by viewing
ourselves in substance-ontological terms as isolated subjects for which a set of material
resource objects presents itself. The naturally wide self is narrowed through the
rendering of the original wideness of self into isolated points within the mathematical
grid framework of substance metaphysics.
The challenging of nature out of phase with natural cycles results in a world in
which humans observe and handle only objects. Everything gets rendered as present-tohand, designated into specific locations for specific purposes according to what aids the
cycles of production and consumption as material for labor. But “modern technology as
an ordering revealing…is no merely human doing.”196 That is: the substance ontology
never annihilates the underlying event ontology. It rather conceals its nature. This
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nature falls into oblivion due to the obliviousness of human beings to the givenness of
Ereignis. Da-sein, in turn, closes and narrows itself. And since Da-sein just is the
clearing of the “there” in which entities can appear as “this” or “that,” the deformation of
Da-sein is also the deformation of possibilities of emergence-into-presence of all beings.
Ereignis as givenness constitutes the underlying essence (or more precisely, as
Heidegger uses this term, “essential presencing”) of any particular object in its
particularity. It is for this reason that the objectification of nature by the substance
ontology results not in any primordial objectification, but rather ultimately in
objectlessness. That is: the objectification of nature is a loss even of objectness. In the
end, all there is nothing but an endless grid of resources on hand for use. Likewise, in
rendering Da-sein in terms of the Cartesian subject that is actually an object, “man
everywhere circles round himself as the animal rationale.”197 The substance ontological
interpretation of nature thus amounts to an anthropocentric distanceless homelessness in
which humans encounter only themselves. Everything gets regarded instrumentally as
strictly for humans.
Heidegger employs his phenomenological method in order to view things in
themselves just as they show themselves from themselves. In Being and Time, we
already see the progression from existence as a work world to deeper and deeper levels of
investigation that progressively reveal the underlying structures of everydayness.
Eventually, in subsequent writings and lectures, Heidegger questions beneath structuring
itself, revealing the event ontology underlying all possible substantial structures: an
ontology which is itself no structure, but upon which all possible structures are erected.
This “upon which” is not a mere basing of one thing upon another: Heidegger is well
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aware of the phantom of the infinite regress that lurks within such an assumption. It is
for this reason that Heidegger’s phenomenology is utterly consistent with itself in
locating the origin of the event ontology in poiesis, or bringing-forth.
Poiesis as bringing-forth is thus the proper answer to our question of origin.
Staying with the nature of poiesis as bringing forth is the way thinking remains in its
element (as thinking). That is:
Thinking comes to an end when it slips out of its element. The element is what
enables thinking to be a thinking. The element is what properly enables: it is the
enabling [das Vermogen]. It embraces thinking and so brings it into its essence.
Said plainly, thinking is the thinking of Being. The genitive says something
twofold. Thinking is of Being inasmuch as thinking, propitiated by Being,
belongs to Being. At the same time thinking is of Being insofar as thinking,
belonging to Being, listens to Being. As the belonging to Being that listens,
thinking is what is according to its essential origin. Thinking is –this says: Being
has fatefully embraced its essence. To embrace a “thing” or a “person” in its
essence means to love it, to favor it. Thought in a more original way such
favoring [Mogen] means to bestow essence as a gift. Such favoring is the proper
essence of enabling, which not only can achieve this or that but also can let
something essentially unfold in its provenance, that is, let it be…To enable
something here means to preserve it in its essence, to maintain it in its element.198
Da-sein fulfils the essence of its nature by fulfilling the essence of what it is to
think: to both open and be the clearing for the givenness of Ereignis. Heidegger refers to
this “act of Da-sein” as an act of listening, an embrace, a gift. It is an act of love. Naess
would certainly employ Kant’s ethical language here by calling such acts “beautiful.”
This act of Da-sein is clearly not an act motivated out of the kind of competitiveness
characteristic of the will to power and domination. Thus, “Thinking towers above action
and production, not through the grandeur of its achievement and not as a consequence of
its effect, but through the humbleness of its inconsequential accomplishment.”199 It is in
the same spirit that Naess says “the smaller we come to feel ourselves compared to the
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mountain, the nearer we come to participating in its greatness. I do not know why this is
so.”200 201
The meaning of poetry as read in terms of the event ontology with regard to
language reveals a deeper meaning than the typical interpretation of the “poetic” as “a
flight into dreamland” or “a part of literature.”202 Although “man acts as though he were
the shaper and master of language…in fact language remains the master of man…For,
strictly, it is language that speaks.”203 Further, “Man first speaks when, and only when,
he responds to language by listening to its appeal.”204
Language beckons us, at first and then again at the end, toward a thing’s nature.
But that is not to say, ever, that in any word-meaning picked up at will language
supplies us, straight away and definitively, with the transparent nature of the
matter as if it were an object ready for use. But the responding in which man
authentically listens to the appeal of language is that which speaks in the element
of poetry. The more poetic a poet is – the freer (that is, the more open and ready
for the unforeseen) his saying – the greater is the purity with which he submits
what he says to an ever more painstaking listening, and the further what he says is
from the mere prepositional statement that is dealt with solely in regard to its
correctness or incorrectness.205
Heidegger is revealing the meaning of the poetry as the Greeks thought it, i.e. as
poiesis. The Greek understanding of poiesis reveals an understanding of the relationship
between natural and human activity. Poiesis as bringing forth breaks down into phusis as
unaided bringing forth and techne as aided bringing forth. Phusis corresponds to the
“natural” activity of what comes forth out of itself, e.g. growing organisms like plants
and animals, whereas techne designates the activity of what does not come forth strictly
of itself, e.g. a painting or a statue. The difference between phusis and techne as modes
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of poiesis and poiesis itself is that whereas the former two occur in the realm of the
visible, poiesis itself is, as Julian Young aptly puts it, “utterly mysterious,
incomprehensible,” demonstrating that “the Greeks…experienced their world as brought
into, and sustained in, being by an overwhelmingly powerful, utterly mysterious
force.”206
This “utterly mysterious force” is that which expresses itself in both the bursting
forth of the blossom into bloom (phusis) and “good art” (techne), as well as the giving of
Ereignis and the opening of Da-sein. Poiesis is “what” is cared for when “Man is the
shepherd of Being. It is in this direction alone that Being and Time is thinking when
ecstatic experience is experienced as ‘care’.”207 Thus,
[M]an, as the ek-sisting counter-throw [Gegenwurf] of Being, is more than animal
rationale precisely to the extent that he is less bound up with man conceived from
subjectivity. Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man
loses nothing in this “less”; rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being.
He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being
called by Being itself into the preservation of Being’s truth. The call comes as the
throw from which the thrownness of Da-sein derives. In his essential unfolding
within the history of Being, man is the being whose Being as ek-sistence consists
in his dwelling in the nearness of Being. Man is the neighbor of being.208
There is thus a distinction between guardianship and ownership, not between
“own” and “not-own.” As Naess puts it, “The own/not-own distinction survives only in
grammar, not in feeling…[T]he ideology of ownership has no place in an ecosophy.”209
As such, the “poverty” of the shepherd actually amounts to the “highest dignity” of Dasein’s essence.210 Thus, the poverty of Dasein’s openness to the givenness of Ereignis
amounts to the very openness necessary for the preservation of poiesis as “the primal
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mystery of all thinking,”211 and, thus, to a making way for a recovery of the sacred
through the recognition and remembrance that “whether and how Being is must remain
an open question for the careful attention of thinking.”212 The watching-over of this
openness comes about through the careful sustaining of the openness of Da-sein in light
of the mysterious bringing-forth of poiesis. But in order to more deeply understand what
this statement means, we must go one “step” further.

E. Releasement
Both Heidegger and Naess are urging their readers towards some kind of selftransmutation. For Naess, this transmutation is self-realization, a widening and
deepening of the typical narrowness of the isolated subject for which the world (subject
included) presents itself as an object. For Heidegger, this transmutation is an opening of
Da-sein to the primordial self-giving of poiesis expressed by the givenness of Ereignis.
Although these two transmutations appear different in terms of the language through
which each view is expressed, they are the same. The deep self of Deep Ecology is the
open Da-sein of Heideggerian phenomenology, especially as expressed in Heidegger’s
later philosophy. Poiesis as bringing forth is the mutual origin of both conceptions. It is
this mutuality that serves as the basis for the assertion of their identity.
We must remember however that to understand this “identity” in substance
ontological terms is to fail to understand its nature. The event ontology of Heidegger’s
thinking provides the proper basis not only for getting at the nature of the activity that is
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being designated by self-realization and the opening of Da-sein, but for understanding
just “what is to be done” in order to bring about such a deepening and opening of oneself.
But the expectation of an instrumental explanation of “what is to be done” is a
misunderstanding of the nature of poiesis in the same way that the rendering of a natural
area in cost-benefit analysis terms is a misunderstanding of nature. “What is to be done”
cannot be laid out in means-ends terms without stumbling headlong into substance
ontological terminology. No action of the individual subject qua subject can bring about
the kind of openness of which both Heidegger and Naess are speaking.
But the question nevertheless persists: what is to be done? Heidegger maintains a
virtually consistent avoidance of ethical prescriptions throughout the whole of his
philosophical career, from the close of Being and Time where he states that we can only
know if a path is the only one or even the right one only after we have followed it, to the
Letter on Humanism in which he states:
Whether the realm of the truth of Being is a blind alley or whether it is the free
space in which freedom conserves its essence is something each one may judge after he
himself has tried to go the designated way, or even better, after he has gone a better way,
that is, a way befitting the question…Let us also in the days ahead remain as wanderers
on the way into the neighborhood of Being.213
Does not the statement “let us remain” invoke at least some semblance of
prescription? It certainly appears that Heidegger is calling upon his readers to do
something. But even if so, the “catch” lies in what he is calling upon his readers to be:
“wanderers.” In a similar fashion, Naess’s frequent reiterations of “Self Realization!”
213
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appear to be some sort of exhortation toward a particular way of being. But if these
statements are indeed exhortative, their nature is peculiar in that we are not given any
particular basis as to why their respective suggestions should be heeded rather than
disregarded. But how does one satisfy such demands for proper explanation without
employing the instrumentalist language characteristic of the technological worldview?
Is Heidegger simply avoiding the issue? Or is he rather remaining consistent with
his event ontology by refusing to yield to such demands? In The Question Concerning
Technology, he provides a clue. There are others, to be sure. But the following quotation
seems particularly apt for our purposes, especially in light of what we have established
with regard to the role of poiesis as bringing forth in Heidegger’s event ontology:
All coming to presence, not only modern technology, keeps itself everywhere
concealed to the last. Nevertheless, it remains, with respect to its holding sway,
that which precedes all: the earliest. The Greek thinkers already knew of this
when they said: That which is earlier with regard to the arising that holds sway
becomes manifest to us men only later. That which is primally early shows itself
only ultimately to men. Therefore, in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort
to think through still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd
wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before
the coming of what is early.214
Within this passage lies not only the rejection of all accusations against Heidegger
that his thinking merely demonstrates a kind of rural romanticism that merely aims at a
return primitivism, but also the reason behind his refusal to answer the question of “what
is to be done?” Namely: there is nothing that anyone can do in and of herself to bring
about the coming of what is early. All we can do is wait. The logic of such an assertion
bears a striking resemblance to the logic of the farmer who knows that screaming at his
corn will not make it grow any faster. There are natural cycles over which we as humans
have no control, and in accordance with which we must plant, wait, and harvest.
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Furthermore, such logic is consistent with the poetic nature of the primal origin of the
event ontology to which both Heidegger and Naess stress the importance of a return:
poiesis is a self-bringing-forth. It is for this reason that techne is second to phusis in the
event ontology to which Heidegger appeals, and not the other way around.
In like fashion, Da-sein opens itself to the givenness of Ereignis when it cares for
the poetic self-bringing-forth of entities as the shepherd of Being. Caring-for and
shepherding, in turn, is a letting-be. It is for this reason that Da-sein is truly open for the
givenness of Ereignis when it makes-way for givenness. Da-sein does not bring such
givenness about on its own – why Heidegger writes:
If we let the thing be present in its thinging from out of the worlding world, then
we are thinking of the thing as thing. Taking thought in this way, we let ourselves
be concerned by the thing’s worlding being…If we think of the thing as thing,
then we spare and protect the thing’s presence in the region from which it
presences. Thinking is the nearing of world. Nearing is the nature of nearness.
As we preserve the thing qua thing we inhabit nearness. The nearing of nearness
is the true and sole dimension of the mirror-play of the world.215
That “thinking is the nearing of world,” indicates that thinking, in its essence, is
not the mere result of an individual subject’s mental activity; nor is Naess’s conception of
self-realization a realization of a particular subject brought about by the sheer force of
that individual’s will power. “The step back from one thinking to the other is no mere
shift of attitude…for this reason alone: that all attitudes…remain committed to the
precincts of representational thinking.”216 Rather, the kind of “thinking” that Heidegger
and Naess have in mind is, as Heidegger puts it in the Discourse on Thinking, a “patient
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noble-mindedness” that is “a pure resting in itself of…willing which, renouncing willing,
has released itself to what is not will.”217
Such a releasement to “what is not will,” amounts to the opening of Dasein that is
necessary for the givenness of Ereignis, the event of clearing in which entities can be this
or that. It is within this “region” that the poetic nature of beings becomes manifest: the
realm where an appreciation of the intrinsic value of that which springs forth in and of
itself becomes manifest, perhaps, for the very first time. Such is the region in which
thinking becomes thanking, “that thanking which does not have to thank for something,
but only thanks for being allowed to thank.”218
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